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ABSTRACT 
 
Available social psychological studies of honor cultures have mostly focused on 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving an honor insult. The aim of 
this study was to examine possible ways of re-instilling a sense of honor and thus avoiding 
the negative emotional consequences of losing honor. A combined honor culture sample of 
Turkish and Latina/o participants (N=59) and a dignity culture sample of North Americans 
(N=57) were compared. Participants received an honor insult in the laboratory, and engaged 
in either self-affirmation or honor-affirmation. Analyses revealed that honor culture 
participants experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition 
compared to the honor-affirmation condition, indicating that self-affirmation is not as 
effective as honor-affirmation in alleviating negative consequences of receiving an honor 
insult for members of honor cultures. Honor versus self-affirmation did not differentially 
affect the reactive honor endorsement of dignity culture participants. Our analyses did not 
reveal similar culture by affirmation interaction for the effectiveness of honor versus self 
affirmation in reducing negative emotional consequences of receiving an honor insult (e.g., 
shame and anger). The implications for future honor research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Jessie and her brother John are sitting in a crowded cafe located in their small 
neighborhood in a Midwestern town, drinking coffee and conversing cheerfully. There are 
three young males sitting at the next table, staring at Jessie for a while. At last, one of them 
dares to say “Look at the chick at that table; what a sexy thing.” All three laugh loudly. John 
is enraged by this. He gets up, walks towards the man, and asks defiantly “Pardon me. What 
did you just say about my sister?” The man answers with a crooked smile on his face, “I said 
what I said. You heard me.” John replies “Then you obviously need to take back what you 
said.” What he got back as a response was worse than the initial deed, “I have no intention of 
taking it back.” John stares back at his sister for a brief moment, nods, and then punches the 
man squarely in the nose. The young man’s white shirt is covered with blood immediately. It 
would be easy to conclude based on his behavior that John is a young man with behavioral 
difficulties who resorts to aggression as a solution to his problems. Maybe he was raised in a 
poor community with little education, maybe he is the bully of the neighborhood, or maybe 
he is on drugs. 
Replace the names John and Jessie with Ahmet and Zeynep, and imagine the situation 
taking place in Turkey, in a small neighborhood in Istanbul. In the case of Ahmet, there is not 
enough evidence to conclude anything about his character. He is as likely to be a bully as a 
well-behaved young gentleman. He might be a high school drop-out, or a doctoral student. 
Maybe he never uses aggression except when the situation definitely calls for it; in other 
words, he behaves aggressively when his honor is at stake. He behaves in an expected 
manner, according to the “honor code” of the Turkish culture. His sister’s honor is his own, 
and not responding to the honor threat will cause them to lose their honor. In that case, their 
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reputation would be tarnished, because the incident is witnessed by some people in their 
neighborhood, leaving him and his sister in a deep state of shame. 
 
Definition of Honor  
 For decades, the construct of honor has been studied extensively by anthropologists 
and sociologists. This rich research notwithstanding, honor is a difficult concept to define. In 
his influential article, Pitt-Rivers (1966) describes honor as the value a person has in his own 
eyes, as well as the extent to which society values him. In other words, it’s the person’s claim 
to pride as well as his right to it. One earns this right to pride by adhering to a socially 
constructed system of symbols that includes values as well as rules of conduct (Friedrich, 
1977). This socially constructed system, in other words, “the honor code,” varies between 
cultures (Casimir & Jung, 2009). Yet there are shared elements of honor codes in so-called 
honor cultures (e.g., Spain, Greece, and Turkey). For instance, honesty, loyalty and a concern 
for reputation are common elements in the honor codes of both Awlad ‘Ali Bedouins of 
Western Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 1986) and of Spanish Andalusians (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). 
In many of today’s Western cultures, even though they are not considered cultures of 
honor, the concept of honor exists in reference to a person’s integrity, pride, and self-worth. 
People view themselves as honorable to the extent that they feel pride as a result of their own 
actions and beliefs. Because the concept of honor exists in both honor and non-honor 
cultures, the question arises as to the difference between an honor culture and a non-honor 
culture.  
For the remainder of this discussion, following the terminology of Cohen and his 
colleagues (e.g., Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011), 
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Western societies in which honor is not a core value in defining the self will be referred to as 
“dignity cultures.” In “dignity” cultures, such as the North American culture, individuals’ 
worth is intrinsic and cannot be devalued by others (Kim & Cohen, 2010; Kim, Cohen, & 
Au, 2010; Leung & Cohen, 2011). This personal sense of dignity comes from a perception of 
a moral core, which does not require external approval. Every individual has an intrinsic and 
inalienable right to dignity. In a “face” culture such as Japan, respectability of the person is 
granted by others by virtue of the individual’s fulfillment of the societal expectations. Social 
relationships are organized by hierarchies, and face can be conferred upon the individual by 
social others that are equal or higher in the social hierarchy. One cannot claim face for 
oneself, because doing so will bring humiliation. “Honor” cultures (e.g., Turkish and Spanish 
cultures) are similar to face cultures in the sense that personal worth is conferred by others' 
respect, and shame is an important emotion regulating one's behavior so as to avoid social 
disapproval. However, face and honor are not synonymous. Honor cultures are dissimilar to 
both dignity and face cultures in interesting ways. On the one hand, in honor cultures, dignity 
is not seen as an inalienable right of a person and self-worth must be approved by others. On 
the other hand, perception of a moral core of a person exists to a certain extent in honor 
cultures, and individuals are expected to claim their honor by confirming this moral core. 
This moral core, however, must be demonstrated by one's behavior and approved by others; 
it is not a given. The current research concerns a comparison between dignity and honor 
cultures, and further discussion of face cultures is beyond the scope of this argument.  
The conceptualization proposed by Cohen and his colleagues is not the only way in 
which social psychologists have defined honor cultures. A number of researchers define a 
society as a culture of honor to the extent that its members’ personal worth is defined in 
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terms of the worth of close others such as family members (e.g., Fischer, Manstead & 
Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999). According to this definition, members of a non-honor culture 
may define themselves as honorable based on their own evaluation of their self-worth. Their 
self-worth may or may not have a bearing on the worth of people with whom they are 
associated. In honor cultures, on the other hand, not only does one’s behavior reflect on 
relational others (such as family members), but also those others’ behaviors reflect on one’s 
own honor. Research suggests that the interpersonal aspect of honor is one of the defining 
characteristics of honor cultures (Fischer, Manstead & Rodriguez Mosquera, 1999; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2002a). However, focusing only on this 
interpersonal aspect almost equates the honor construct to collectivism (see Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991, for a discussion of collectivist cultures); hence, being an honor culture 
becomes synonymous with being a collectivist culture. In fact, many social psychologists use 
the misleading terminology of “honor cultures versus individualistic cultures” (e.g., 
Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2000).  
Equating honor construct with collectivism is misleading in several ways. First of all, 
some core elements of the honor code of a given honor culture that is otherwise considered a 
collectivistic society can also reflect individualistic values. For instance, both loyalty to one's 
tribe (a collectivistic value), and autonomy (an individualistic value) are essential to the 
definition of the honor code for Awlad ‘Ali Bedouins of Western Egypt (Abu-Lughod, 
1986). According to the observations of Abu-Lughod (1986), in this collectivist society of 
Bedouins, failing to protect the interests of the tribe during a commercial transaction while 
furthering one's own households' interests could seriously jeopardize one's honor. On the 
other hand, undermining one’s own authority by showing weakness and dependence on 
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socially equal others would be equally detrimental for a man’s honor. Second, some 
important personal characteristics like integrity and honesty are considered to be defining 
characteristics of the honor construct in both individualistic Western cultures and in honor 
cultures (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1986; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). 
Apparently, the presence of values related to interconnectedness is not enough to 
explain the difference between the two kinds of cultures. What makes a society an honor 
culture above and beyond these values pertaining to sharing honor with close others is the 
centrality of honor to its members' sense of self-worth (Casimir, 2009), and their willingness 
to defend it in the face of imagined or real offenses (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cohen, Nisbett, 
Bowdle & Schwarz, 1996). Put in a different way, an important difference between honor 
and non-honor cultures is the relative strength of honor values in eliciting strong emotions 
and behaviors in individuals. 
In summary, for a society to be considered an honor culture, a distinct honor code 
should exist, and members of this culture should have a shared understanding of what this 
honor code entails. Honor of family members and kin should have an influence on an 
individual's personal honor. Perception of personal worth in honor cultures should entail a 
moral core of each individual that should be both claimed by the individual himself/herself 
and at the same time approved by the society. And finally, in honor cultures, honor values 
should elicit stronger emotions and reactions in individuals compared to dignity culture 
cultures.  
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Honor and Self-Esteem 
Members of honor cultures attain honor by adhering to the culturally constructed 
honor codes. Honor codes define the characteristics of an ideal honorable person and this 
definition is agreed upon by all of the members of the society. Consequently, individuals do 
not have the freedom to re-interpret their failure to abide by the honor code when their 
behavior does not fit the expected pattern. For instance, let us assume that chastity is an 
element of the female honor code in a given honor culture, and that members of this culture 
agree upon the description of chastity as sexual virginity until marriage. Under these 
circumstances, losing one's virginity would result in a loss of honor even though the 
hypothetical female in question regards chastity as a matter of loyalty to one's partner and 
considers herself to be a dignified person.  
Different aspects of the honor code do not carry equal value within each honor 
culture. Some characteristics of an ideally defined person are necessary elements of having 
honor, the absence of which brings shame and dishonor. Some other characteristics, however, 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for honor. Having these characteristics can enhance one's 
honor, making the person more honorable than some other people, but the absence of these 
characteristics does not jeopardize one's honor, at least, not to the extent that the absence of 
core elements would. For the Andalusian culture (the southern region of Spain), for instance, 
refusal to submit to humiliation is a necessary element of having honor for a man, whereas 
loyalty is not necessary but a valued characteristic (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). 
 According to Pitt-Rivers (1966), necessary elements, in other words requirements of 
honor, come from ethically neutral values that any person should have in order to achieve at 
least acceptable levels of respectability. These values are ethically neutral in the sense that 
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everybody is expected to demonstrate these properties, and they are minimum requirements 
for having acceptable levels of honor. Although Pitt-Rivers (1966) discusses necessary 
elements only in terms of characteristics pertaining to gender differences (e.g., modesty for 
females), it is possible to categorize gender-neutral elements of honor (e.g., trustworthiness, 
helpfulness, honesty) into necessary versus peripheral categories. Consider taking other 
people's possessions versus sharing one's possessions with others as an example (assuming 
that it is part of a hypothetical honor code). Not stealing would be considered an ethical 
neutral that everybody should be able to accomplish. Under these circumstances, if a person 
steals he would lose honor, but a person who does not steal cannot claim (based solely on 
this) that he is much more honorable than other people (most of whom do not steal either). 
Applying Pitt-Rivers' (1966) conceptualization to this example, not stealing would be one of 
the necessary elements of honor. Sharing one's possessions and resources with less fortunate 
ones, however, would not be a necessary element. People would not be required to engage in 
this kind of charitable act in order to claim honor, and not be stigmatized as dishonorable on 
the basis of this aspect alone. Doing so would certainly enhance one's honor given that one 
already fulfills the necessary requirements, but it is only one of many possible behaviors that 
could increase and/or decrease one's honor.  
 Because of the inflexibility of honor codes, failures to abide by the honor code, 
especially the core elements of it, result in possible loss of one’s reputation and a deep sense 
of shame. Shame is considered to be the strongest emotional reaction to loss of honor in the 
anthropology literature (e.g., Casimir, 2009; Peristiany, 1966; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). The relation 
between honor and shame also has been demonstrated in psychological research. For 
instance, in a self-report study comparing Spanish (an honor culture) and Dutch (a dignity 
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culture) participants, Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2000) showed that different situations are 
potent in eliciting shame for Spanish and Dutch. Spanish participants considered unfavorable 
public evaluations of the self (a potential honor threat) as a more important antecedent of 
shame compared to Dutch participants, whereas Dutch participants considered self-failure as 
a more important antecedent of shame compared to their Spanish counterparts.  
The function of honor as an assessment tool of self-value in honor cultures is served 
by self-esteem in dignity cultures. Self-esteem can be broadly defined as people's favorable 
global evaluations of themselves in their own eyes (e.g., Baumeister, Smart & Boden, 1996; 
Bosson & Swann, 2009). Unlike honor in honor cultures, however, what makes someone an 
ideal person with high self-esteem is not agreed upon by the whole society in a dignity 
culture. This is not to say that one's self-esteem is not affected by one's perception of how 
others evaluate the self. To the contrary, self-esteem is influenced by perception of one's 
social worth. This indeed, is the basic tenet of the sociometer theory of self-esteem (Leary & 
Baumeister, 2000). According to sociometer theory, self-esteem is a sociometer signaling 
one's acceptance by others or detecting rejection cues. In other words, high-self-esteem is not 
a basic goal of the self-system, but it is an indication of one's successful satisfaction of the 
need to belong (Leary, 2004; Leary & Baumeister, 2000).  
 Unlike the assumptions of sociometer theory, many classical theories concerning self-
esteem consider it a basic motivation of the self in and of of itself (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995). 
Moreover, in order to fulfill this basic motivation in a healthy fashion, one must try to build 
self-esteem based on one's internal strengths, and not on external contingencies like social 
approval (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1995). A great deal of social psychology research has examined 
the consequences of basing one's self-esteem on different criteria. For instance, Crocker and 
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her colleagues (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper & Bouvrette, 2003) created the Contingencies of 
Self-Worth scale which measures seven distinct sources of self-esteem: physical appearance, 
approval from others, outdoing others in competition, academic competence, family support, 
virtue, and God's love. Crocker and Luhtanen (2003) found that the strongest correlation 
between global self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem inventory and 
each of the contingency subscales was that of approval from others. However, this strong 
correlation was consistently negative, implying that basing one's self-worth on others' 
approval was detrimental to self-esteem, at least in the American samples that were surveyed 
(Crocker & Luhtenan, 2003).  
Although theories vary in their assumptions of what constitutes the source of healthy 
self-esteem, even the proponents of a socially based self-esteem (e.g., Leary, 2004) do not 
claim that there are socially prescribed strict definitions of what could or could not bring 
esteem to a person. In other words, the source of self-esteem may be social acceptance, yet 
the perception of social acceptance may vary for different individuals. As the discussion on 
honor in the previous section implies, however, this is not the case for honor. In cultures 
where an honor code exists, there is an agreed upon definition of honor, and the 
characteristics of an honorable person are socially prescribed in a strict sense. If, for instance, 
the existing honor code in a hypothetical culture specifies that it is not honorable to look 
elders in the eyes, doing so would cost one's honor whether or not one feels valued by friends 
and family. In this current analysis, the inflexibility of the definition of being honorable is 
considered one of the basic differences between honor and self-esteem. 
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Consequences of Losing Honor 
 In a classic study by Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz (1996), male University 
of Michigan students were bumped by a confederate and insulted by being called an 
“asshole.” In three experiments, in response to this insult, participants who were raised in the 
US South were found to have higher cortisol and testosterone levels in their blood, they were 
more likely to report anger, and they were more likely to have aggression-related cognitions 
as shown by unobtrusive tasks (such as sentence and scenario completion) compared to their 
counterparts who were raised in the Northern US. It is interesting to note, however, that those 
Southern participants who did not receive the insult were not different on these aggression-
related measures than their Northern counterparts. According to Cohen et al. (1996), these 
differences are caused by the fact that Southern US society is a culture of honor (Nisbett, 
1993). 
 In honor cultures, aggression is an acceptable reaction to insults and threats to one's 
honor. This does not mean, however, that people are in general more violent across all 
situations in an honor culture compared to a dignity culture. Indeed, surveys conducted in 
Southern U.S. reveal that members of this culture endorse aggression only when it is 
perceived as self-protective or a defense of one's honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).  
 In honor cultures, aggression is not only acceptable but even required in the face of an 
honor attack if one wants to continue one's claim to honor. Ethnographic and sociological 
research on diverse honor cultures such as Kurdistan (Akman, 2002), Spain (Gilmore, 1987), 
rural Greece (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969), and Turkey (Oner-Ozkan & Gencoz, 2008)  
suggests that members of honor cultures consider retaliation as a duty when one's self or 
family is insulted. Failure to do so would indicate accepting the insult and admitting that one 
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is not worthy of honor. The most effective way to restore the tarnished honor would be to 
repudiate the insult by showing that one is willing to engage in physical aggression when 
necessary. Under certain circumstances, when the accusation or insult is perceived as 
justified, such as when a female member of the family engages in an pre-marital/extra-
marital sexual affair, aggression is directed towards the “wrongdoer” rather than the insulting 
party, the most extreme case of which is embodied in intra-familial honor killings (e.g., 
Abdo, 2004).  
 Although such actions constitute the extreme end of aggression in the name of honor, 
they reveal a great deal about the nature of the process by which one can re-affirm honor 
after losing it. First, the willingness of people in honor cultures to take such radical measures, 
however painful and self-destructive they may seem, gives us clues about the negativity of 
consequences if one fails to do so; they include shame, ridicule, loss of respect and social 
resources, and even complete ostracism (Akman, 2002). In traditional societies where social 
mobility is low, and where the social, psychological, and material prospects of people are 
closely interwoven with those of the family, tribe, or clan members, ostracism would not 
only mean loss of social support, but also a loss of material resources that are necessary for 
survival. Second, the fact that the target of aggression is either the offender or the wrongdoer 
suggests the necessity of addressing the problems of honor directly rather than peripherally. 
Stated in Pitt-Rivers' (1966) terms, losing honor by accepting humiliation (a necessary 
element) cannot be repaired by demonstrating excellence in peripheral elements. 
 When one does not have the ability or opportunity to take appropriate action, one 
would experience debilitating emotions such as shame. As mentioned before, in honor 
cultures shame is considered to be the strongest emotional reaction to loss of honor. In many 
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such societies, words corresponding to shame are used as synonyms for dishonor (e.g., 
Casimir, 2009; Peristiany, 1966, Pitt-Rivers, 1966), and proneness to shame is considered to 
be a positive quality because it implies one's concern for losing honor. This idea is captured 
by phrases like “having a sense of shame” in many cultures of honor (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 
1986; Gilmore, 1987; Peristiany, 1966). In this respect, shame is not only an emotional 
consequence of honor loss but also an important regulator of behavior. The regulatory role of 
shame is implicated by the results of a recent study comparing Turkish/Moroccan minority 
and Dutch majority participants in the Netherlands (Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, 
& Zaalberg, 2008). In response to honor insults coming from family members and important 
others (where angry retaliation is not desirable), participants of Turkish or Moroccan descent 
reacted with verbal disapproval of the insult rather than a verbal attack to the extent that they 
were concerned with protecting their social image. Their desire to protect their social image 
was closely associated with the level of shame that they reported. For Dutch participants, 
shame did not have a strong association with a desire to protect one's social image, and it did 
not influence one's choice of retaliation or withdrawal behavior. 
 Rodriguez Mosquera and her colleagues also examined the relation between honor 
offenses and shame cross-culturally (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead & Fischer, 2002b). In 
this study, the researchers asked their Spanish (an honor culture) and Dutch (a dignity 
culture) participants to indicate the extent to which they would experience shame in response 
to situations that would constitute honor offenses. Not surprisingly, the results of their 
experiment revealed that Spanish participants anticipated more shame in response to the 
hypothetical situation of being depicted as a disgraceful member of their family (an offense 
to family honor) than did Dutch participants. Dutch participants, on the other hand, 
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anticipated more anger and shame in response to the hypothetical situations of being 
portrayed as a person who is not autonomous and assertive (independence related values) 
than did Spanish participants.  
 In summary, the evidence provided above strongly suggests that members of an honor 
culture are more likely to experience shame in the face of real or imagined honor insults 
compared to members of a dignity culture.  
 
Honor and Self-Affirmation 
 Research conducted in Western settings suggests that one's global self-esteem is 
flexible and resourceful in the face of inadequacies. There is ample evidence showing that 
people distort and reinterpret social reality in ways that bolster their self-worth, such as by 
dismissing negative or risky information pertaining to the self (e.g., Kunda, 1987), seeking 
more accurate information about one's positive traits compared to one's negative traits (e.g., 
Sedikides, 1993), and considering one's positive attributes as more important than one's 
negative attributes (e.g., Pelham & Swann, 1989), to name a few. For instance, Dunning and 
his colleagues (e.g., Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Dunning, Meyerowitz & Holzberg, 1989) 
showed that people consider behaviors and characteristics that they personally demonstrate to 
be more central to the definition of desirable traits compared to those behaviors and 
characteristics that they do not demonstrate. In other words, even when there is some 
agreement on what is a desirable attribute to have, people tweak the definition of these 
attributes in idiosyncratic ways in order to maintain a positive view of themselves. 
 One important process that points to this flexibility is self-affirmation (Steele, 1988). 
According to the theory of self-affirmation, people seek to maintain a positive self image as 
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having self-integrity and overall adequacy (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spencer 
& Lynch, 1993). When a person's positive image is threatened, one can engage in one of 
many available restorative processes, such as dismissing the threatened aspect of self-image, 
or biasing perceptions of self-worth in a self-serving manner. Self-affirmation, however, is 
the process by which the self restores its overall positive image by affirming a self-value that 
is dissimilar to the threatened aspect. The major goal of the self-affirmation process is not to 
dissolve the specific threat to a certain self-aspect, but rather to maintain global integrity and 
self-worth, in other words to re-affirm the threatened self as a whole (Steele, 1988). 
 In a typical experimental setting, participants' global self-integrity is threatened by 
such procedures as making them write a counter-attitudinal essay (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983), 
forcing them into making a less than optimal choice (e.g., Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993), or  
reminding them the hazards of a risky behavior that they are already engaging in (e.g., 
Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). This is followed by the affirmation of self-worth. 
Affirmation procedures also vary, from giving participants some positive personality 
feedback (Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 1993) to letting them fill out a value scale concerning a 
value domain that they deem important (e.g., Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). The results 
of self-affirmation studies reveal that people do not engage in defensive and restorative 
processes such as dissonance reduction (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, Spencer & Lynch, 
1993), or defensive dismissal of risky information (e.g., Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; 
Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000 ) if they have the opportunity to self-affirm.  
 According to Sherman and Cohen (2006), it is possible for the observed effects of 
self-affirmation to work to the extent that different aspects of self (which come together to 
constitute the self-concept) are approximately equally valuable, and the shortcomings in one 
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area (e.g., not being competent in academics) can be compensated by strength in other 
equally valued areas (e.g., being true to your ideals). In contrast, one's global self-integrity 
cannot be restored by affirming a relatively unimportant aspect of the self.  
 The literature reviewed thus far suggests that for people socialized in honor cultures, 
honor is a distinct and central aspect of self with unique emotional and cognitive elements as 
well as behavioral scripts. For people socialized in dignity cultures, however, one's honor is 
just one aspect of the global self-concept, not as distinct or specialized as the honor construct 
in honor cultures. Therefore, it can be stipulated that perceived attacks on one's honor would 
not have different consequences than perceived attacks on any other self-aspect that is not 
related to honor for members of dignity cultures. Affirmation of such an unrelated aspect of 
the self could protect people from dignity cultures from experiencing the negative 
consequences of an honor insult. For members of an honor culture, in contrast, affirmation of 
an unrelated aspect of the self would not be enough to re-instill a sense of honor and prevent 
shame after an insult to their honor. For members of honor cultures, honor and self-esteem 
are distinct indications of perceived self-worth. Competence and academic success for 
instance, does not have a strong influence on one’s perceived honor; however, it would 
definitely increase one’s self-esteem. In other words, it would be possible for someone raised 
in a culture of honor to feel very honorable without having high levels of self-esteem, and to 
feel dishonored without losing self-esteem. The present research will shed light on this 
distinction, by examining the differential effects of honor and self-affirmation. 
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Honor in Turkish, Latina/o and the North American Cultures  
The two honor cultures that are the focus of the present research are Latin and 
Turkish cultures. Spanish culture has been the focus of anthropological and ethnographic 
studies on honor (Caro-Baroja, 1966, 1992; Gilmore, 1987; Pitt-Rivers, 1966). In fact, the 
previously discussed concept of necessary elements of honor, which is one of the main 
focuses of the present research, was initially postulated by Pitt-Rivers (1966) based on his 
observations of the Spanish society. Social psychology studies examining US Latina/o (e.g., 
Leung & Cohen, 2011, Vandello & Cohen, 2003) and Latin American samples (e.g., 
Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franjuk, 2009), including Portuguese speaking Brazilian 
culture (e.g., Vandello & Cohen, 2003) reveal that Latino culture at large can be considered 
part of the Spanish honor culture.  
Like many other Mediterranean societies, Turkish culture is also an honor culture. 
Therefore, honor is expected to be very central to one’s sense of self in Turkish culture. Most 
of the available sociology and psychology literature on Turkish honor focuses on gender 
differences in the Turkish honor code, female chastity, and honor-related violence (e.g., 
Akkoc, 2004; Bagli, & Sev'er, 2003; Ozgur, & Sunar, 1982). Although sexuality is one of the 
central concepts of Turkish honor code, honor in Turkey is a much more complex construct 
with many different components, such as having high social status and honesty. 
 In a recent study of Turkish and North American honor prototypes, Cross and her 
colleagues (Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Sunbay, & Ataca, 2010) were able to identify four 
dimensions of the honor construct that were comparable in these two cultures (i.e., Turkey, 
an honor culture, and Midwestern United States, a dignity culture). These four dimensions 
were obtained in a factor analyses of honor concepts (which were generated by Turkish and 
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American college students) rated for their centrality by Turkish and American participants. 
These dimensions were status and respect (e.g., one's position in the society), behavior and 
character (e.g., keeping promises, honesty), convictions and pride (e.g., not compromising 
one's own values), and helping others (e.g., willingness to sacrifice for other people). In both 
of these cultures, behavior and character was considered to be the most important aspect of 
having honor. 
The prototype analyses of concepts related to dishonor (also generated by Turkish and 
American college students) revealed fewer similar honor value dimensions across the 
cultures. The Turkish dishonor construct had more dimensions than the American dishonor 
construct, and the factor structures were dissimilar. The most important dimension for both 
cultures, however, was somehow similar, and it tapped the same construct as the behavior 
and character aspect of having honor (e.g., dishonesty). 
 As stated before, necessary (core) aspects of honor refer to those attributes the lack of 
which would jeopardize one's honor. Peripheral aspects, on the hand, are those attributes that 
can enhance one's honor, but their lack would not necessarily pose a threat to honor. The 
studies conducted by Cross et al. (2010) suggest that the behavior and character dimension 
is a core aspect of honor for the Turkish culture as it is the most important dimension of both 
having and not having honor. The other three aspects, namely status and respect, convictions 
and pride, and helping others are peripheral aspects. As the results of this prototype study 
reveal, it is possible to capture similarities of lay conceptions of honor in an honor culture 
and a dignity culture, although emotional and behavioral consequences of demonstrating 
these attributes (or failure to do so) might be very different for the members of these two 
cultures. 
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Despite the plethora of research focusing on Spanish and Latin American honor 
cultures, no previous study has systematically examined core aspects of honor in this specific 
cultural geography. Two studies that attempted to come up with prototypes of honor concept 
in the Spanish culture were conducted by Fischer, Manstead, and Rodriguez Mosquera 
(1999), and by Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead and Fischer (2002a). These two studies used 
cultural values of Schwartz (1992) as a starting point. In the first study by Fischer et al. 
(1999) Spanish participants evaluated several of these values (including the value “honor”) in 
terms of their importance in the Spanish culture. According to their results, true friendship, 
social recognition, humility, helpfulness, respect for parents and the elderly, respect for 
tradition, and wisdom were positively correlated with honor. In the second study by 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) participants were presented with a similar list of values 
and asked to evaluate how much each attribute would contribute to a person’s honor. 
According to the results of this second study, attributes that would contribute most to a 
person’s honor are altruism, honesty, loyalty, self-achievements, a good reputation, and self-
respect.  
Two points should be kept in mind while considering these studies. First, honor 
values in Fischer et al. (1999) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) studies were created by 
the researchers and then presented to the participants to evaluate. Thus, it is possible that 
there are elements in Spanish/Latin honor construct that were not captured by these studies. 
In Cross et al.’s (2010) prototype analyses, however, the honor attributes participants 
evaluated were created by a separate sample of participants from Turkey and US. Second, it 
is difficult to determine what aspects of honor are peripheral and aspects are core in the 
Spanish/Latin honor construct based on Fischer et al. (1999) and Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 
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(2002a). Nevertheless, based on sociological and anthropological literature cited above, as 
well as the empirical findings by Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a), we can claim that 
honesty is one of the important elements of honor values of the Latino culture. Therefore, 
members of the Latin honor culture should not be different than members of the Turkish 
honor culture in terms their perception of criticism of one’s honesty as an honor affront. 
 
Overview of the Present Study 
 The aim of this study is to compare the effects of honor versus self-affirmation on the 
level of shame experienced after receiving an honor insult between members of honor 
cultures and a dignity culture. The honor cultures that will be examined are Turkish and 
Latino cultures and the dignity culture is the U. S. Midwest. In this study, participants will 
receive an insult targeting the core aspect of honor (i.e., honesty). Following this, participants 
will have a chance to engage in either self-affirmation or an honor affirmation in the core 
aspect of honor. Effects of these affirmation tasks will be compared in terms of their potency 
in reducing the level of shame. 
 Ethnographic and anthropological accounts explain in detail honor codes of different 
honor cultures. According to these accounts, failure to demonstrate different aspects of a 
given honor code are not equally important in jeopardizing one's honor. However, effects of 
these different aspects were not systematically examined in psychological studies. For 
instance, honor offenses used in most experimental studies are general insults that do not 
target any specific honor value (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996). To our knowledge, the importance 
of core aspects of honor was not examined in any of these studies. In the current study, the 
honor offense is created on the basis of previous research on prototypes of the honor 
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construct in Turkey and America (Cross et al., 2010). This study will be the first to examine 
the effects of a threat to a core aspect of honor experimentally.  
The most common approach in the literature to studying the effects of honor offenses 
has been to examine people's reactions to hypothetical situations (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera 
et al., 2002b). Some studies utilize autobiographical recollections of previously experienced 
offensive events (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a; 2008). These studies have the 
ability to analyze only those events that have been already experienced by the participants. 
Moreover, these studies have many possible confounds such as the severity of the incidents 
and the source of the insult. The current design overcomes these problems by specifically 
attacking one of the core elements of honor in a controlled laboratory environment.  
 Another important contribution of this research to the existing literature is to 
potentially demonstrate the effectiveness of re-affirming one's honor by the individual. 
Previous studies focused on emotional, cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perceiving 
an honor threat (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Fischer et al, 1999, 
Ijzerman, van Dijk & Gallucci, 2007). However, possible ways of re-instilling honor and thus 
avoiding the negative emotional consequences of losing honor have not been systematically 
tested. In this study, participants will go through various affirmation procedures, and their 
effectiveness in reducing negative emotions (i.e., shame and anger) will be examined. 
 In this study, participants will receive an honor insult representing the core honor 
aspect (i.e., honest behavior and character) in the laboratory. Half of participants will go 
through an honor-affirmation procedure that will give them the opportunity to affirm the 
insulted aspect of honor. The other half will receive a self-affirmation treatment. Following 
this, their shame levels will be assessed. Shame constitutes the major dependent variable of 
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this study. Hypotheses concerning the effect of different types of affirmation on shame are as 
follows: 
Main Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 1.  Honor culture participants (i.e., Turkish and Latino) who engage in 
honor-affirmation in the core honor domain about which they were insulted will experience 
less shame compared to honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation.  
Hypothesis 2.  Dignity culture participants (i.e., American) who engage in honor-
affirmation and self-affirmation will experience similar amounts of shame.  
 The main concern of the present study is to analyze the relations between honor and 
shame, and the potential of honor-affirmation in reducing shame. Yet, anger is one of the 
most commonly studied consequences of receiving insults in the literature. The effects of an 
insult on the level of anger participants experience will also be examined, in an effort to 
complement the findings in the literature. The assumptions of this current study concerning 
anger are parallel to the assumptions concerning shame.  
 Several exploratory analyses also will be carried out concerning the participants in the 
self-affirmation condition. It has been observed in previous self-affirmation research that 
people engage in dismissal of negative or risky information pertaining to self when they do 
not have an opportunity to affirm their self-value (Sherman et al., 2000). Based on this 
observation, and considering the assumption that self-affirmation cannot mend the damage 
caused by an honor insult for members of honor cultures, it is plausible to expect that Turkish 
and Latino participants in the self-affirmation condition will try to react to the honor insult 
with an increased dismissal of the insult, as well as a higher endorsement of the honor values. 
The hypotheses concerning these peripheral assumptions are as follows: 
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Secondary Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 3.  Honor culture participants who receive honor-affirmation in the core 
honor domain about which they were insulted will experience less anger compared to honor 
culture participants who receive self-affirmation.  
Hypothesis 4.  Dignity culture participants who receive honor-affirmation and self-
affirmation will experience similar amounts of anger.  
 Hypothesis 5.  Honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition will 
demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult compared to honor culture participants in 
the self-affirmation condition. No such difference is expected in the dignity culture sample. 
 Hypothesis 6.  Honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition will 
demonstrate higher levels of reactive honor endorsement in the core honor aspect compared 
to honor culture participants in the honor-affirmation condition. No such difference is 
expected in the dignity culture sample. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Overview 
 In this study, the effects of honor affirmation and self-affirmation on level of shame 
following an honor attack were compared across dignity and honor cultures. Participants in 
each culture were randomly assigned to honor-affirmation or self-affirmation conditions. 
Baseline levels of shame and other emotions were assessed in an initial session. All 
participants received a standard honor attack at the beginning of a second session followed 
by the affirmation. Post-test levels of emotions were assessed after the affirmation task. 
 
Participants 
 Dignity culture of interest in the current study was North American culture. One 
criterion for participating was to identify oneself as Euro-American. The initial sample 
consisted of 68 dignity culture and 63 honor culture members (34 Latina/o and 29 Turkish 
participants). American participants were recruited from Iowa State University (ISU) 
psychology participant pool, and they received partial course credit for their participation. 
Latina/o and Turkish participants were contacted through the ISU multicultural student 
organizations (i.e., Argentinean-Uruguayan-Chilenean Students Association, 
Latinoamericanos, Latina/o Graduate Student Association, Latino Heritage Committee, 
Mexican-American Young Achievers Society, Puerta-Rican Students Association, and 
Turkish Student Association). A snowballing technique was used to contact honor culture 
participants who were not members of the aforementioned organizations. Latina/o and 
Turkish students received monetary compensation of $15 for their participation.  
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In the dignity culture sample, eight participants (6% of the overall sample) did not 
complete the second session of the study, and 3 participants (2% of the overall sample) were 
eliminated due to suspicion. The final dignity culture sample consisted of 57 participants, 33 
of whom were female. In the honor culture sample, 3 (2% of the overall sample) participants 
did not complete the second session of the study and one participant (less than 1% of the 
overall sample) was eliminated from the sample due to suspicion.  The final honor culture 
sample consisted of 59 participants, 34 of whom were female. Mean age of the dignity 
culture sample was 19.88 (SD = 1.92) and the mean age of the honor culture sample was 
24.03 (SD = 4.81). An independent samples t-test revealed that the difference was 
statistically significant, t (77) = -6.15, p<.001, d=1.14. Levene's test indicated unequal 
variances (F=36.25, p <.001), therefore degrees of freedom were adjusted from 114 to 77. 
In the dignity culture sample, all participants identified their country of origin as the 
United States of America, and their first language as English. In the honor culture sample, 12 
participants identified their country of origin as the USA, 22 participants as Turkey, 4 
participants as both the USA and Turkey, 10 participants as Mexico, 6 participants as Puerto 
Rico, and 2 participants as Columbia. There were one participant from Chile, Equador, and 
Portugal, each. In this honor culture sample, the most frequently indicated first language was 
Spanish with 29 participants, followed by Turkish with 22 participants. 3 participants 
indicated that their first language was Kurdish, and 2 participants identified themselves as 
English-Turkish bilinguals. English and Portuguese were indicated as the first language of 
one participant, each. 
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Measures and Instruments 
Session 1 
 Measures in the first session are listed below. Turkish participants completed all the 
measures in Turkish and North American and Latina/o participants completed the measures 
in English. Except for Heatherton and Polivy’s (1991) state self-esteem scale and Scott’s 
(1965) personal values scale, all scales were used with Turkish samples in previous studies, 
and available Turkish versions were used. For the purposes of the current study, the state 
self-esteem scale and personal values scale were translated into Turkish and backtranslated 
into English by two bilinguals who were fluent in both English and in Turkish.  
Questionnaires that appeared in the first session are presented in Appendix A. 
Demographic information form. Participants responded to a demographic 
information form which included several questions about gender, age, SES, ethnicity and 
language. The demographic information form also included questions designed to measure 
the level of acculturation of the honor culture participants (Appendix A).  
Acculturation. Questions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the demographic information 
form was used to measure acculturation level of honor culture participants. These questions 
were, “How often do you speak English when you are with your friends?”, “What percentage 
of your friends are Euro-Americans?”, “ How much do you read, listen to, and watch English 
(in books, in newspapers, in music, on TV, on the web, in the movies, etc.)?”, “How often do 
you write in English?”, “How often do you think in English?” and  “Please indicate when 
you came to USA. Participants responded to questions 10 through 14 on nine point scales 
ranging from 1 to 9. Question 15 was open ended. Answers to this question were converted 
into a nine point scale in the following manner: Participants received the score “1” if they 
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stayed one year or less in the United States. Any participant who stayed in the United States 
more than one and less than two years received a score of “2”. In this way, maximum number 
of years spent by each participant was converted into a matching likert score up until seven 
years (e.g., a score of “6” for six years, a score of “7” for seven years). Participants who 
spent more than seven and less than fifteen years in the US received a score of “8.” Finally, 
participants who spent more than fifteen years in the US (including those participants who 
spent their entire life in the US) received a score of “9.” 
Reliability analyses revealed that these six items had Cronbach’s alpha of .72 for the 
honor culture sample. Average of these six items was calculated to obtain a numerical 
representation of acculturation level of honor culture participants. Higher scores indicate 
greater levels of acculturation to the North American culture. Comparing Turkish and 
Latina/o participants revealed that the Latina/o sample scored significantly higher on this 
acculturation measure (M= 6.69, SD=1.17) compared to the Turkish sample (M= 5.01, 
SD=1.59), t(57) = 4.68, p<.001. Although Turkish participants were older (M= 26.22, 
SD=3.61) than the Latina/o participants (M= 22.32, SD=5.14), t(56) = 3.30, p<.01, Latina/o 
participants (M= 14.32, SD=9.99) spend more years in the US than the Turkish participants 
(M= 3.48, SD=3.98) in USA, t(40)=5.56, p<.001. Levene's test indicated unequal variances 
(F=29.09, p <.001), therefore degrees of freedom were adjusted from 56 to 40. The Turkish 
sample’s lower acculturation to the North American culture is probably due to having spent 
less time in USA. 
Self-esteem. Participants' trait self-esteem was measured with Rosenberg’s self-
esteem scale (1965). Participants' state self-esteem was measured with Heatherton and 
Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES).  
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Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale (SES). SES (1965) is a self-report measure of 
global self-esteem, consisting of ten items such as “On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself.” (Appendix A) It is one of the most widely used measures of global self-esteem in 
social psychology research. Although it has been recently proposed that SES reflects multiple 
components (see Tafarodi, & Milne, 2002; Tafarodi, & Swann, 1995), the scale has generally 
been treated as a unidimensional measure. In previous studies, SES was found to have 
comparable reliability levels in American and Turkish samples (Cronbach’s alphas of .88 and 
.88 for American and Turkish samples, respectively; Cross, Uskul, Gercek-Swing, Sunbay, 
Ataca, 2010). 
 Participants rated each item on how much each statement reflects their feelings on a 
seven point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s alphas 
for the dignity and the honor culture samples in the first session of this study are .87 and .82, 
respectively. In the second session, Cronbach’s alphas are .89 and .86, for the dignity and 
honor cultures, respectively. 
Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) state self-esteem scale (SSES). SSES (1991) is a 
twenty item self-report measure of self-esteem with three subscales: Performance, social and 
appearance (Appendix A). In their initial validation study, Heatherton and Polivy (1991) 
reported internal consistency of .92 for the overall scale.  
 Participants rated each of the 20 items of the questionnaire on how much each 
statement reflects their current feelings on a five point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely). Cronbach’s alphas of the overall measure in the first and second sessions were 
.92 and .91 for the dignity sample, and .89 and .86 for the honor sample. In the first session, 
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Cronbach’s alphas for the three subscales varied between .77 and .89 across the two cultures. 
In the second session, Cronbach’s alphas for the three subscales varied between .75 and .85. 
Personal Values Scale. In order to discover important self-aspects of the participants 
that are unrelated to honor, the intellectualism, physical development, and creativity 
subscales of Scott's (1965) personal values scale was used. Participants’ highest ranking self-
value was used as the topic of writing task in the self-affirmation condition. Scotts' (1965) 
original values inventory is composed of 12 subscales of intellectualism, kindness, social 
skills, loyalty, academic achievement, physical development, status, honesty, religiousness, 
self-control, creativity, and independence. Only intellectualism, physical development, and 
creativity subscales were used in this study, because the other nine subscales of Scott's 
(1965) inventory tap constructs that are similar to honor prototypes of Turkish and American 
cultures obtained by Cross et al. (2010). For participants who are in the self-affirmation 
condition, their most highly rated value among the three (their score in the first session) was 
used as the topic of the self-affirmation manipulation.  
 According to the results of Scott's (1965) validation studies, reliabilities of the 
Personal Values Scale subscales range between .80 (honesty) and .89 (physical 
development). The intellectualism, physical development, and creativity subscales are 
composed of 21, 20, and 22 items, respectively. In the original studies Scott (1965) asked his 
participants to indicate whether or not each item was desirable for other people to have by 
selecting one of three options: “always dislike”, “depends on situation”, and “always 
admire”. Only “always admire” responses (“always dislike” responses for the reversed items) 
were scored. Thus, the total score of each subscale was the number of items that received a 
response of “always admire”.  
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 In order to create consistency between honor and personal value scales, participants 
in this study were asked to indicate the desirability of having the attributes described in each 
item on a 7 point Likert scale from 1(not desirable at all) to 7 (extremely desirable). 
(Appendix A). Cronbach’s alphas of the intellectualism, physical development and creativity 
subscales for the dignity and the honor culture samples in the first session of this study were 
.90, .89 and .89 for the dignity sample, and .88, .86 and .86 for the honor sample. Similarly, 
in the second session, Cronbach’s alphas for the three subscales varied between .85 and .90 
across the two cultures.  
Reactive Honor Endorsement. The behavioral and character (core) subscale of 
Honor Values Questionnaire was used to measure reactive honor endorsement of 
participants. Reactive honor endorsement was defined as the increase of the score on this 
measure from first to the second session.  
The honor values questionnaire was developed on the basis of the prototype analyses 
of honor concepts by Cross et al. (2010). In order to elucidate lay conceptions of honor in 
Turkey and America, Cross and her colleagues asked participants to generate descriptions of 
what it means to be a person with honor and what it means to be a person without honor. 
These open ended responses were categorized by bilingual coders into unique concepts (e.g., 
doing good things), separately for honor and dishonor items. In a second study, a total of 118 
unique concepts of honor, and a total of 60 unique concepts of dishonor were rated by a 
different sample of Turkish and American participants in terms of each concept's importance 
for the definition of honor on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 7 
(extremely important).  
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 Exploratory factor analyses revealed four aspects of honor that are comparable in the 
two cultures, with items with similar loadings for the two cultures. The first aspect, status 
and respect, is represented by 16 items (e.g., one's position in the society). The second 
aspect, behavior and character, is represented by 11 items (e.g., keeping promises). The third 
aspect, convictions and pride, is represented by 13 items (e.g., not compromising one's own 
values), and finally, the fourth aspect, helping others is represented by 6 items (e.g., 
willingness to sacrifice for other people)  
 Exploratory factor analyses of dishonor items revealed very different factor structures 
for the two cultures. One factor that was comparable in the two cultures produced 18 items 
with similar loadings for the two cultures. The items of this factor tap the same underlying 
aspect of honor as the behavior and character factor that was obtained in the honor aspects. 
Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alpha for these honor factors that were obtained 
in Cross et. al.'s (2010) initial studies are provided in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alpha of the Perceived Importance for the 
Factors of Honor in Cross et al. (2010) 
    USA     TR 
Factor    Mean  SD    Cronbach’s Mean  SD   Cronbach’s 
      alpha    alpha 
Status and Respect 4.37 .59 .94 3.87 .40 .94 
Behavior and Character 5.67 .60 .85 5.91 .48 .87 
Convictions and Pride 5.27 .29 .89 4.87 .49 .87 
Helping Others 5.68 .26 .81 4.81 .27 .89 
Dishonor 5.59 .26 .97 5.94 .47 .95 
  
Participants in the current study rated these 46 honor and 18 dishonor items on how 
much the attribute or behavior represented in each item is desirable for them to demonstrate 
31 
 
  
 
in their daily life on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (not desirable for me at all) to 7 
(extremely desirable for me) (Appendix A). Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's 
alphas for the Turkish and the Latina/o samples are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for the 
first and second sessions, respectively. Cronbach’s alphas for the combined honor sample 
and the dignity sample in the first and second sessions of this study are presented in Table 4 
and Table 5. 
Shame and anger. Participants' implicit shame was measured with the Implicit 
Association Task and the facial emotion perception task. The facial emotion perception task 
was also used to assess other honor related emotions: Anger, pride, disgust and anxiety. 
 Implicit Association Test. Participants' shame was measured by the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a computerized 
reaction time test intended to measure the strength of learned associations between two 
concepts. The underlying assumption of the IAT is that sorting well associated concepts 
together is easier than sorting poorly associated concepts together. Since its introduction, the 
IAT has been used to research a range of topics such as aggression (e.g., Uhlmann & 
Swanson, 2004), attitude-behavior consistency (Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001), and 
self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).  
 In a typical session, participants categorize stimuli into different groups and computer 
key mappings are changed so that the two related concepts are sometimes indicated with the 
same key, and sometimes with a different key. Faster reaction times when two concepts are 
mapped to the same key indicate a stronger association between those concepts. 
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Table 2  
Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons 
                 Turkish Culture                    Latina/o Culture             Mean Difference  
   N =27       Cronbach’s                    N=32         Cronbach’s         
              Mean     SD         alpha       Mean   SD           alpha                      t-value 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) 5.74 .97 .86  5.59 .86 .79  -.66 
2.  Self-esteem (State)  4.11 .43 .86  3.65 .60 .88  -3.27* 
3.  Perform (SSES)  4.12 .59 .74  3.78 .68 .79  -2.01 
4.  Social (SSES) 4.49 .45 .74  3.65 .75 .78  -5.11* 
5.  Appearance (SSES) 3.65 .54 .70  3.51 .84 .86  -.76  
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor)  6.57 .50 .90   6.12 .70 .90  -2.79 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) 5.20 .85 .93  5.47 .86 .91   1.21 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) 6.08 .58 .89  5.98 .86 .90  -.52 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  6.33 .52 .88  6.16 .49 .83  -1.30 
10. Dishonor (Honor)  6.58 .44 .91  6.24 .61 .91  -2.48  
11. Physical Development (Personal)  5.57 .64 .90  5.85 .63 .88  1.70  
12. Creativity (Personal) 5.27 .68 .87  5.04 .72 .86  -1.27  
13. Intellectualism (Personal) 5.83 .66 .89  5.47 .72 .86  -1.96  
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)  2.56 .78 .75  2.93 .66 .56  1.92 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) 2.25 .81 .62  3.19 .90 .55  4.19* 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)  2.41 .96 .67  2.41 1.02 .75   .01 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) 3.35 .96 .62  3.32  1.10 .68  -.08 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)  1.92 .64  .59  2.85 1.06 .63  4.02* 
19. IAT -.46 .41  -.32 .36  1.54 
20. Acculturation 5.01 1.59 .79 6.69 1.17 .51 4 .68*  
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Table 2 Continued 
Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons 
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Impilicit Association Task; Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale. 
*p<.0025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
34
 
 
Table 3  
Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable in Session 2 for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons  
                 Turkish Culture                    Latina/o Culture             Mean Difference  
   N =26       Cronbach’s                    N=32         Cronbach’s         
              Mean     SD         alpha       Mean   SD           alpha                      t-value 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) 5.84 .87 .89  5.43 .94 .86  -1.72 
2.  Self-esteem (State)  4.18 .37 .83  3.69 .54 .84  -3.95* 
3.  Perform (SSES)  4.21 .47 .66  3.76 .63 .75  -3.01 
4.  Social (SSES) 4.51 .44 .75  3.80 .64 .66  -4.75* 
5.  Appearance (SSES) 3.76 .49 .63  3.48 .85 .83  -1.51  
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor)  6.51 .51 .96  6.32 .56 .89  -1.41 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) 5.61 .70 .92  5.47 .66 .87   -.77 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) 6.17 .57 .94  6.09 .72 .88  -.46 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  6.35 .44 .91  6.25 .61 .93  -.70 
10. Dishonor (Honor)  6.69 .39 .93  6.34 .49 .90  -2.95  
11. Physical Development (Personal)  5.55 .69 .91  5.84 .63 .88  1.70  
12. Creativity (Personal) 5.24 .77 .93  5.03 .74 .87  -1.06  
13. Intellectualism (Personal) 5.83 .70 .93  5.61 .79 .91  -1.15  
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)  2.28 .96 .72  3.01 .76 .62  1.05 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) 2.28 .67 .69  3.27 .98 .70  3.86* 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)  2.34 .95 .59  2.49 .97 .67   .57 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) 3.30 .78 .51  3.43  1.12 .76  .51 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)  1.90 .81  .74  2.87 1.17 .76  3.58* 
19. IAT -.51 .39  -.37 .33  1.51 
20. Defensive Dismissal 4.62 1.61 .89 3.96 1.16 .74 -1.80  
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Table 3 Continued 
Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable in Session 2 for Turkish and Latina/o Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons   
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback 
*p<.002 
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Table 4  
Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons 
                  Dignity Culture            Honor Culture         Mean Difference  
   N =57         Cronbach’s   N=59        Cronbach’s 
              Mean     SD         alpha         Mean   SD          alpha              t-value 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) 5.71 .87 .87  5.66 .91 .82  .33 
2.  Self-esteem (State)  3.79  .68  .92  3.86 .57 .89  -.64 
3.  Perform (SSES)  3.96 .69 .85  3.93 .66 .77  .18 
4.  Social (SSES) 3.85 .86 .89  4.03 .75 .83  -1.21 
5.  Appearance (SSES) 3.51  .92 .89  3.57 .72 .80  -.40  
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor)  6.29 .74 .92   6.32 .65 .90  -.30 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) 5.08 1.06 .94  5.34 .86 .92   -1.45 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) 6.01 .68 .80  6.03 .74 .89  -.08 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  6.29 .58 .91  6.23 .51 .84   .54 
10. Dishonor (Honor)  6.16 .55 .88  6.39 .56 .91  -2.24  
11. Physical Development (Personal)  6.10 .59 .90  5.72 .64 .88  3.28*  
12. Creativity (Personal) 4.98 .73 .89  5.15 .70 .86  -1.21  
13. Intellectualism (Personal) 5.49 .68 .89  5.63 .71 .86  -1.08  
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)  3.12 .71 .71  2.76 .74 .66  2.67 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) 3.22 .93 .71  2.76 .98 .65  2.59 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)  1.82  .62 .56  2.41 .98 .69  -3.83* 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) 3.53 1.02 .74  3.33  1.03 .65  1.03 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)  2.99 .92  .69  2.42 1.00 .66  3.16* 
19. IAT -.46 .54   -.39 .39   -.74 
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Table 4 Continued 
Session 1 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach's Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons 
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Impilicit Association Task. 
*p<.0026 
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Table 5  
Session 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons  
                 Dignity Culture                     Honor Culture          Mean Difference  
   N =57         Cronbach’s   N=58        Cronbach’s 
              Mean     SD         alpha         Mean   SD          alpha              t-value 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) 5.71 .87 .89  5.61 .92 .86  .58 
2.  Self-esteem (State)  3.97 .60 .91  3.91 .52 .86  .56 
3.  Perform (SSES)  4.12 .66 .82  3.96 .60 .75  1.33 
4.  Social (SSES) 4.04 .74 .85  4.12 .66 .76  -.60 
5.  Appearance (SSES) 3.71 .78 .84  3.61 .72 .78  .75  
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor)  6.42 .49 .84   6.40 .54 .91  .16 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) 5.23 .90 .94  5.53 .68 .87   -2.05 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) 6.02 .75 .84  6.13 .65 .89  -.81 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  6.30 .60 .91  6.30 .54 .91  .11 
10. Dishonor (Honor)  6.41 .56 .91  6.50 .48 .89  .97  
11. Physical Development (Personal)  6.09 .57 .89  5.71 .67 .88  3.27*  
12. Creativity (Personal) 4.99 .66 .85  5.13 .76 .89  -1.05  
13. Intellectualism (Personal) 5.61 .65 .87  5.71 .75 .90  -.74  
14. Anger (Face Perception Task)  3.10 .65 .50  2.92 .72 .68  1.41 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) 3.22 .90 .69  2.82 1.08 .74  2.13 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task)  1.73 .64 .71  2.42 .96 .64   -4.51* 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) 3.44 .97 .67  3.37 .98 .67  .39 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task)  2.97 .96  .72  2.44 1.13 .78  2.76 
19. IAT -.44 .39  -.43 .37   -.19  
20. Defensive Dismissal 4.83 1.32 .82 4.25 1.40 .84 2.28  
   
39
 
 
Table 5 Continued 
Session 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas of Each Variable for the Dignity and the Honor Cultures with 
Group Comparisons   
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback. 
*p<.0025 
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 During the first block, participants learned target concept discrimination. The target 
concepts that the participants discriminated was “Self” and “Other.” Self-related words that 
appeared on the computer screen were: ME, MINE, WE, OUR, MYSELF (BEN, BENÍM, BÍZ, 
BÍZÍM, KENDÍM, in the Turkish version). Other related words that appeared on the computer 
screen were: OTHERS, THEM, THEIRS, HIS, HE. (BAŞKALARI, ONLAR, ONLARIN, 
ONUN, O, in the Turkish version). The “L” key was associated with “Other” related words, 
and “A” key was associated with “Self” related words. The first trial block included 20 trials 
in which each self and other-related word appeared twice in random order. 
 During the second block, participants learned attribute discrimination. Attribute 
categories that were discriminated were “Shame” versus “Pride”. Shame related words that 
appeared on the computer screen were: SHAME, EMBARASSMENT, DISGRACE, 
DISREPUTE, HUMILIATION (UTANÇ, MAHÇUBÍYET, REZÍLLÍK, KEPAZELÍK, 
AŞAĞILANMAK in the Turkish version). Pride related words that appeared on the computer 
screen were: PRIDE, DIGNITY, RESPECT, PRAISE, ESTEEM (GURUR, HAYSÍYET, 
SAYGI, ÖVGÜ, ÍTÍBAR, in the Turkish version). The “L” key was associated with “Shame” 
related words, and “A” key was associated with “Pride” related words. The second trial block 
included 20 trials in which each shame and pride related word appeared twice in random 
order. 
 During the third block, the tasks from the first two blocks were combined so that “L” 
key was associated with other and shame words, and the “A” key was associated with self 
and pride words. The third block included 20 trials in which each self, other, shame and pride 
related word appeared once in a random order. The fourth block consisted of 40 critical trials. 
These use the same stimuli and key mappings as the trials in block three. In the fifth block 
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participants categorized pride and shame words, but the key mappings was reversed, such 
that “L” key was associated with pride, and the “A” key was associated with shame. The fifth 
block consisted of 20 trials. Block six combined the new pride and shame mappings with self 
and other, such that the “L” key corresponded to other and pride, and the “A” key was 
associated with self and shame. During this block participants completed 20 trials in which 
each self, other, shame and pride related word appeared once in random order. Block seven 
was the second critical block, and used the same words and mappings as block six in 40 
trials.  
 Half of the participants received a version of this task with the self and other mapping 
reversed such that self always corresponded to “L” key and other always corresponded to 
“A” key (thus reversing the order of the self-pride and self-shame critical blocks). 
 Implicit shame was computed based on the strength of the association between self 
and shame. For the computation, the algorithm proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji 
(2003) was used. In the current sample, there were no participants for which more than 10% 
of trials had latencies less than 300 milliseconds (extremely fast). Therefore, no participant's 
IAT data had to be eliminated. As a first step, trials with latencies of greater than 10.000 
milliseconds were eliminated. Then, mean of correct latencies were computed for each block, 
and pooled standard deviations were calculated for blocks 3 and 6, and blocks 4 and 7 
respectively. Following this, error latencies were replaced with block means plus 600 
milliseconds. New block means were computed after this replacement. Mean differences 
between blocks 6 and 3, and blocks 7 and 4 were divided by their corresponding pooled 
standard deviance, and these two quotients were averaged. This resulting number, which can 
be described as a standardized difference between shame trials in self-pride blocks and 
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shame trials in self-shame blocks, was used for analysis. Higher scores indicate higher 
implicit shame.  
 Facial emotions perception task.  Implicit shame and anger experienced as a result of 
receiving an insult was also measured by a modified version of an anger projection task used 
by Ijzerman et al. (2007). We also used this task to measure implicit disgust, pride and 
anxiety. In this projective test, perceived intensity of a facial expression implies accessibility 
of that specific emotion.   
Participants viewed five different black and white photos of faces representing 
emotions of anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and a neutral expression, as well as three morphed 
pictures representing dominance, submissiveness, and neutrality, taken from the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces Set (KDEF; Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998). Participants rated 
the extent to which each image depicted five emotions (anger, shame, pride, anxiety, and 
disgust) on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all strong), to 7 (very strong). The average 
anger rating for the eight faces was used as the measure of implicit anger. For the measure of 
implicit shame, one of the faces (i.e., face depicting disgust) reduced reliability of the overall 
shame measure. Therefore, as the measure of implicit shame, the average shame rating of 
seven faces was used. Although there were no specific hypotheses concerning pride, anxiety 
and disgust, these were included as exploratory measures of possible honor-related emotions. 
Score of implicit disgust was obtained by averaging disgust rating of all eight faces. In order 
to increase low reliabilities, average ratings of seven and six faces were used for calculating 
anxiety and pride scores, respectively. Means, standard deviations and Cronbach's alphas for 
the Turkish and the Latina/o samples are provided in Table 2 and Table 3 for the first and 
second sessions, respectively. Cronbach’s alphas for the combined honor sample and the 
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dignity sample in the first and second sessions of this study are presented in Table 4 and 
Table 5. 
Bogus information processing task. In order to prevent fatigue from responding to 
lengthy questionnaires and to increase the plausibility of the cover story that influence of 
personality on socio-cognitive perception is examined, participants received a computerized 
bogus task during each session. In each task participants received the same set of 20 words, 
10 of which appeared on the right side of the computer monitor, and 10 of which appeared at 
the left side of the computer monitor. These words were APPLE, RED, PRECISION, TIME, 
EFFICIENCY, ORDER, ANGER, SHAME, BEAUTIFUL, CALM, EMBARASSED, 
SNOOZE, PRIDE, MINUTE, BLUE, FOUR, FACE, QUICK, PINK, and SPEED. The task 
was presented as a cognitive-speed test and participants were asked to press “L” key for each 
word that appears at the right side, and “A” key for each word that appears at the left side.  
Session 2 
 In the second session, participants received the honor insult first, followed by the 
affirmation task. Following this, they completed all the measures from the first session. 
Finally, they completed the final evaluation form. Materials that appeared only in the second 
session are presented in Appendix B. 
Honor insult. Participants received bogus feedback on three made-up dimensions of 
social information processing, personality, and values with fabricated statistical data 
(Appendix B). They received slightly positive feedback on the dimension of social 
information processing, perception and cognitive speed, and neutral feedback on one of the 
made-up dimension of personality and values, globalism and uncertainty avoidance. 
Feedback on the third dimension, insight and psychological control, included negative 
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information about the core aspect of honor, and it constituted the honor insult in this study. It 
implied that they were dishonest and untrustworthy individuals. Their extremely low score 
on this dimension was flagged in red. In order to make sure they paid attention to the insult, 
they received a written explanation only on their lowest ranked dimension, insight and 
psychological control. Also, they were told that they would have a chance to talk to a 
psychometrics expert at the end of the study and to ask her questions about their 
performance.  
Honor-affirmation and self-affirmation. All honor affirmation manipulations 
consisted of an essay writing task.  The essay writing affirmation method used in this study is 
based on a modified version of the procedure employed by Fein and Spencer (1997). In Fein 
and Spencer's (1997) study participants indicated their most important value on a value scale, 
and then wrote several paragraphs explaining the importance of this value.  
 In the current study, participants in the honor-affirmation condition were instructed to 
write about the behavior and character aspect of honor, which corresponds to the honor 
insult they received. More specifically, they were asked to write a paragraph describing an 
incident in which they behaved in an honest, trustworthy and just way and to elaborate on the 
importance of these characteristics. Participants in the self-affirmation condition were 
instructed to write a similar paragraph, this time about a domain that was captured by their 
highest ranked personal value subscale (i.e., intellectualism, physical development, or 
creativity) based on their first session scores (Appendix B).  
 Final evaluation form. To assess the defensive dismissal of the insult, and to see 
whether or not the manipulation (honor insult) was effective, participants were presented 
with a short feedback form at the end of the second session. This form included several filler 
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items, manipulation check questions, and items that were designed to assess defensive 
dismissal of the initial feedback (Appendix B).  
Manipulation check. Four open-ended manipulation check questions assessed how 
much of the negative feedback participants remembered. Two of these questions asked 
participants to name the dimension of personality that they scored highest and lowest on. The 
other two questions asked participants to report their percentile ranking on their lowest and 
highest dimensions as accurately as they could remember. Examination of the responses 
revealed that forty-seven participants either correctly reported the dimension label, namely, 
“insight/psychological control”, or, provided a description of it such as “being not honest and 
being manipulative of others.” Twenty-seven participants correctly indicated that it was the 
second personality dimension on the feedback form, but did not indicate the name or the 
description of the dimension. Of these twenty-seven, fourteen reported their correct 
percentile, seven reported a lower percentile score than the correct standing (17), and five 
reported a higher percentile score. Forty-two participants either indicated that they did not 
remember the dimension name, or a general description that was not interpretable such as 
“my personality and values,” or did not provide a written response. Of these forty-two, 
twenty-six reported their correct percentile, nine reported a lower percentile score than the 
correct standing (17), and seven reported a higher percentile score. 
To determine whether or not inaccurate responses indicated a lack of understanding 
the negative feedback, debriefing interview forms were examined. Experimenters took 
extensive notes during the interviews designed to probe for suspicion before the oral 
debriefing (Appendix B). Examination of these forms revealed that all participants 
understood that they received very negative personality feedback, which indicated that they 
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had a low standing among their peers. Therefore, no participants were eliminated on the basis 
of the manipulation check.  
 Defensive dismissal of the insult. The final four questions (questions 7, 8, 9, 10, 
Appendix B) of the final evaluation form were designed to assess defensive dismissal of the 
feedback. These questions were “How helpful was the personality feedback you received at 
the beginning of this session?”, “How accurate was the personality feedback you received at 
the beginning of this session in terms of reflecting your characteristics?”, “How much do you 
agree with the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?”and 
“Would you consider taking into account the feedback you received for self-improvement 
purposes?” Participants rated these items on 7-point scales (e.g., 1=not helpful at all, 
7=extremely helpful for question 7 and 1=completely disagree, 7=completely agree). 
Reliability analyses revealed that these four items had Cronbach’s alpha of .82 and .84 for 
dignity and honor culture samples, respectively. Higher scores on these items indicated 
willingness to take the feedback into account. Therefore, each of these items was reverse-
scored and the average was calculated to obtain a numerical representation of defensive 
dismissal of the initial feedback. Higher scores on this scale indicate greater levels of 
dismissal.   
 
Procedure  
Participants attended the study individually in two separate sessions that were 
approximately one week apart. Participants were told that the aim of the study was to develop 
a new values and personality inventory that could provide valid comparisons across Latino/a, 
Turkish and North American cultures. They were informed that personality variables 
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influence socio-cognitive perception and behavior in important ways, and although the 
influence of these variables on socio-cognitive perception within each culture is well 
understood, cross-cultural comparisons are more difficult in the sense that similar personality 
or cognitive styles might have different consequences in cultural contexts.  
During the first session, participants filled out a computerized battery of 
questionnaires using MediaLab® in two different orders. In both of these orders, the first two 
questionnaires that they responded to were the demographic information questionnaire and 
Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale. These two questionnaires were followed by the facial 
emotion recognition task and the implicit association task. After this, the participants 
completed the state self-esteem scale of Heatherton and Polivy (1991). Four subscales of the 
honor values questionnaire, the dishonor questionnaire and three subscales of the personal 
values questionnaire of Scott (1961) were presented in the last half of the session in two 
different orders. A filler questionnaire and a bogus cognitive speed task were embedded 
between these questionnaires. The procedure took less than 40 minutes. At the end of the first 
session, the participants were told that the battery would be scored by a system developed by 
expert personality psychologists, and they would receive feedback during their next session 
which would reflect their personality compared to people from their own culture. 
At the beginning of the second session, participants were reminded briefly of the aim 
and the importance of the study. Participants were also reminded that they were promised 
feedback on their personality scores. The experimenter left the cubicle to print their scores 
and brought back the bogus feedback form that had the participants’ own participation 
number on it, along with a blank piece of paper. Participants received bogus negative 
feedback on their personality about the core aspect of honor, which implied that they were 
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dishonest and untrustworthy. This constituted the honor insult in this study. The feedback 
form they received explicitly indicated that detailed explanation is provided only for scores 
below the 50th percentile, and for statistical data and explanations for all three dimensions, 
they should consult another document. This bogus statistical report for the population was 
readily available in the laboratory for participants who would like to see the extra 
explanations. No participant requested to see it. 
In order to prevent participants from arguing with the experimenter, they were told 
that they had only a couple of minutes to read their scores before the study started, and that 
they could discuss their results with the experimenter at the end of the session. The blank 
paper was provided so that they could write down their questions or concerns about their 
score for later discussion. After 2 minutes, the experimenter returned to the cubicle of the 
participant to start the procedure.  
Just as in the first session, participants completed the second session measures using 
MediaLab®. The first questionnaire that they responded to was a short version of the 
demographic information questionnaire. Following this, participants completed the 
affirmation task. The affirmation task involved writing a paragraph using the instructions that 
the experimenter brought in a sealed envelope. The affirmation task was followed by the 
facial emotion recognition task and implicit association task. After these two tasks were 
completed, participants completed the state self-esteem scale of Heatherton and Polivy 
(1991), Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale, the four subscales of the honor values 
questionnaire, the dishonor questionnaire and three subscales of the personal values 
questionnaire of Scott (1961). As was the case in the first session, a filler questionnaire and a 
bogus cognitive speed task were embedded among these questionnaires. At the very end, 
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participants completed the study feedback form, which included questions about how 
accurate they found the personality feedback they received. This procedure took 
approximately 60 minutes. After they completed all the measures, participants were probed 
for suspicion and extensively debriefed. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses 
Comparisons of Latina/o versus Turkish Samples 
We first examined the baseline means and standard deviations of each variable 
assessed in the first session for Turkish and Latina/o cultures and compared the groups 
(Table 2). We conducted independent samples t tests for each of these variables, using 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0025 per test (.05/20). As presented in Table 2, five of 
these comparisons were statistically significant. The Turkish sample scored significantly 
higher on overall state self-esteem scale and social subscale of state self-esteem scale 
compared to Latina/o sample. There were also significant cultural differences on two of the 
five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. On 
baseline levels of implicit disgust and shame, the Turkish sample scored significantly lower 
than Latina/o sample. Finally, the Turkish sample scored significantly lower than the 
Latina/o sample on acculturation. As mentioned in the method section, Latina/o participants 
spent more years in the US compared to the Turkish participants in USA. Most of the 
participants in the Turkish sample were international students who came to study in the US. 
The Latina/o sample, however, was more heterogeneous in the sense that it included not only 
Latino Americans who were born in the US or migrated early in their life, but also 
international students who came to US recently. This probably explains the Turkish sample's 
lower acculturation to the North American culture. 
 Means and standard deviations of each variable for the Turkish and Latina/o samples 
assessed in the second session with group comparisons are presented in Table 3. Independent 
samples t tests were conducted for each of these variables, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
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levels of .0025 per test (.05/20). As presented in Table 3, four of these comparisons were 
statistically significant. The Turkish sample scored significantly higher on overall state self-
esteem scale and the social subscale of state self-esteem compared to the Latina/o sample. 
There were also significant cultural differences on two of the five implicit measures of 
emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. On implicit disgust and shame, 
the Turkish sample scored significantly lower than the Latina/o sample. 
Comparisons of Dignity and Honor Groups 
The scores for the Turkish and the Latina/o samples were combined to create the 
honor culture group. Baseline means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s alphas of each 
variable assessed in the first session for the dignity and the honor samples are presented in 
Table 4. Independent samples t tests were conducted for each of these variables, comparing 
the baseline levels across two cultural groups, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 
.0026 per test (.05/19). Three of these comparisons were statistically significant. On the 
physical Development subscale of the personal values scale, the dignity sample scored 
significantly higher than the honor sample. There were also significant cultural differences 
on two of the five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions 
perception test. On baseline levels of implicit anxiety, the honor sample scored significantly 
higher than the dignity sample. On baseline levels of implicit shame, however, the honor 
sample scored significantly lower than the dignity sample. 
Means and standard deviations of each variable assessed in the second session for the 
dignity and the honor culture groups are presented in Table 5. Independent samples t tests 
were conducted for each of these variables, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0025 
per test (.05/20). Two of these comparisons were statistically significant. On the physical 
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Development subscale of the personal values scale, the dignity sample scored significantly 
higher than the honor sample. There was also a significant cultural difference on one of the 
five implicit measures of emotions as assessed by the facial emotions perception test. The 
honorsample scored significantly higher than the dignity sample on implicit anxiety. 
Bivariate correlations of all variables for the honor and dignity samples in session 1 
and in session 2 are presented in Table 6 and in Table 7, respectively
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Table 6  
Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
  1.  2.     3.        4.        5. 6. 7.     8. 9. 10.  
1.  Self-esteem (Trait)  .64*** .52*** .54*** .54*** .22 .14 .19 .46** .07 
2.  Self-esteem (State) .54***  .80*** .90*** .79*** .05 -.08  .20 .29* .07 
3.  Perform (SSES) .55*** .85***  .66*** .40** .25† .06 .30* .33* .22 
4.  Social (SSES) .27* .83*** .58***  .56*** -.04  -.24† .09 .18 .13 
5.  Appearance (SSES) .52*** .74*** .50*** .37**  -.04 -.02 .13 .24† -.17 
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor) .22† .21 .17 .27* .05  .27* .61*** .57*** .47*** 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) .15 -.22† -.24† -.23† -.06 .14  .39** .41** -.09 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) .13 -.00 -.14 .08 .04 .55** .24†  .53*** .32* 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor) .24† .12 .05 .14 .10 .47** .27* .30*  .25† 
10. Dishonor (Honor) .16 .20 .14 .36** -.05 .74** .04 .54** .33* 
11. Physical Development (Personal) .51*** .15 .19 .01 .19 .16 .28* .03 .36**  .06 
12. Creativity (Personal) .40** .54*** .50*** .41** .40** .27* -.24† .09 .27* .37** 
13. Intellectualism (Personal) .41** .38** .37** .36** .18 .26* -.12 .11 .40**  .41** 
14. Anger (Face Perception Task) .03 -.15 -.11 -.28* .04 -.02 .27* -.04 .06 -.09 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) -.06 -.28* -.28* -.29* .08 -.17 .29* -.12 -.01 -.30* 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task) .07 -.03 -.05 -.12 .12 -.06 .06 -.04 .04 -.05 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) .10 .08 .10 .02 .07 -.03 .13 -.25† .06 -.13 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task) -.10 -.34** -.26* -.45** -.07 -.23† .21 -.20 -.04 -.20 
19. IAT -.02 -.24† -.17 -.26* -.14 -.10 -.02 -.03 .01  -.03 
20. Acculturation -.05 -.24† -.17  -.28*  -.12  -.31* .19  -.09  -.15 -.34** 
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Table 6 Continued.  
Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
      11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) .05 .03 -.10 -.22 -.09 .12 .06 .12 -.16 a 
2.  Self-esteem (State) .03 .21 -.06 -.19 -.08 .08 .08 -.05 -.11 a  
3.  Perform (SSE) .20 .11 .08 -.20 -.11 .14 .04 -.08 -.17 a 
4.  Social (SSE) -.09 .26† -.02 -.30* -.25† -.01 -.09 -.13 -.06 a 
5.  Appearance (SSE)     -.01 .15 -.19 .04 .18 .09 .26† .10 -.06 a 
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor) .17 -.21 -.03 .30* .25† .19  .28* .28* -.02 a 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor)  .25† -.27* -.05 .30* .44*** .06 .36** .28* -.04 a 
8.  Helping Others (Honor) .18 -.04 .09 .23† .23† .11 .28* .29* -.07 a 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor) .19 .01 .05 .16 .30* .10 .31* .14 -.21 a 
10. Dishonor (Honor) .12 .18 .33* .01 .04 .18 .05 .14 .18 a 
11. Physical Development (Personal)  .06 .33* .07 .28* .27* .45** .13 -.15 a 
12. Creativity (Personal) .38**  .52*** -.16 .01 .23† .10 .00 .12 a 
13. Intellectualism (Personal) .51*** .74***  -.10 .02 .27* .08 -.09  .09 a 
14. Anger (Face Perception Task) -.09 -.17 -.30*  .66*** .19 .44*** .75*** .11 a 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) .06 -.31* -.35** .56***  .24 .71*** .63*** -.07 a 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task) -.19 -.04 -.18 .63*** .35**  .50*** .16 .19 a 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) -.06 -.09 -.17 .59*** .43** .48***  .52*** -.05 a 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task) -.13 -.25† -.42** .64*** .62*** .51*** .38**  .14 a 
19. IAT -.19 -.08 -.25† .24† .01 .17 .03 .20 
20. Acculturation .08 -.15 -.10 .16  .33* -.19 -.06 .09 .03 
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Table 6 Continued 
Correlations among Variables in Session 1. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Implicit Association Task; Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale. 
a. Not computed because “Acculturation” is constant. 
†p<.1, *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 7  
Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
  1.  2.     3.        4.             5.           6.             7.            8.           9.          10. 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait)  .75*** .61*** .61*** .65*** .13 .03 .23† .32* .13 
2.  Self-esteem (State) .65***  .84*** .89*** .78*** -.04 .01  .11 .30*  .01 
3.  Perform (SSES) .69*** .83***   .67***    .43***  .00  -.01  .16 .36** .04 
4.  Social (SSES)  .36** .79*** .49***  .53*** -.02 -.04 -.05 .14  .07 
5.  Appearance (SSES)  .52*** .78*** .51*** .38**  -.08 .08 .19  .27* -.11 
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor)  .43*** .20 .26† .19 .04    .13 .41**  .38**     .63*** 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor)  .37** .07 .25† -.03 -.04 .32*  .30* .44*** .13 
8.  Helping Others (Honor)  .34** .21 .25† .15 .11 .57*** .44***  .52*** .34** 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  .55*** .16 .29* .10 .01 .61*** .42** .52***  .19 
10. Dishonor (Honor)  .39** .27* .28* .35** .01 .67*** .09 .52*** .49***  
11. Physical Development (Personal) .44*** -.03 .12 -.24† .07 .26* .21 .26* .37** .07 
12. Creativity (Personal) .51*** .49*** .49*** .31* .39** .44*** -.04 .29* .47*** .33* 
13. Intellectualism (Personal) .56*** .37** .41** .21 .28* .58*** .06 .45*** .54*** .47*** 
14. Anger (Face Perception Task) .09 -.14 .02 -.22† -.13 .03 .30* -.20 .16 -.12 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) -.06 -.34** -.32* -.29* -.20 -.14 .25† -.22 -.02 -.33* 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task) .09 .00 .09 -.15 .08 -.20 .10 -.12 -.07 -.10 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) .08 -.06 -.08 .02 -.10 -.07 .22 -.20 .01 -.19 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task) -.04 -.32* -.23† -.33* -.22 -.11 .14 -.29* -.06 -.24† 
19. IAT -.09 -.06 .05 -.05 -.15 -.16 -.06 .15 -.17 -.14 
20. Defensive Dismissal -.09 -.29* -.23† -.30* -.16 -.14 -.04 -.32* -.15 .20 
21. Acculturation .12 -.35** -.34** -.22† -.26* -.12 -.12 .03 -.08 -.27* 
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Table 7 Continued 
Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
      11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.          17.          18.           19. 20. 
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) .13  .18 .14 -.00 -.05 -.10 .10 -.03 .06 -.27* 
2.  Self-esteem (State)  .11          .29*  .03 .05  .05 .05  .20  .06 .59 -.15 
3.  Perform (SSE)  .30* .28* .22†  -.02  -.01  .10 .19 -.03 -.10 -.21 
4.  Social (SSE)  .05 .25† -.02 .00        -.04         -.05       .11          .04  .05 -.10 
5.  Appearance (SSE) -.06          .19 -.13  .14  .17  .08  .22†  .14 .20 -.08 
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor) .19 -.02  .22† .08  .01  -.14  .08  .09  .19 -.20 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) .46*** -.00 .18  .44***  .33**  .12  .41**  .40**  .01 .16 
8.  Helping Others (Honor)  .25† .17 .46***  .33*  .31*  .06  .33*  .30*  .14 -.21 
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  .42** .27* .28*  .30*  .28*  -.02  .39**  .27*  .05 .04 
10. Dishonor (Honor) .06   -.06  .21  .01  -.12  -.21  -.03  -.02  .27* -.37** 
11. Physical Development (Personal)  .28* .50***  .38**  .33*  -.00  .41**  .23†  -.36** .08 
12. Creativity (Personal) .33*  .53*** .15 .02 .09 .09 .05 -.10 .18 
13. Intellectualism (Personal) .50*** .76***   .14 .01 .07 .09  -.02  -.11 -.06 
14. Anger (Face Perception Task) -.02 -.12 -.10  .64*** .01 .60*** .75*** .03 .38** 
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) .07 -.35** -.35** .65***  .17  .74***  .64***  -.15 .40** 
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task) -.06 -.08 -.12 .52*** .37**  .21 .15 .10 .12 
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) -.01 -.28* -.22 .57*** .68*** .31*  .66*** -.21 .23† 
18. Shame (Face Perception Task) .01 -.28* -.30* .72*** .75*** .41** .60***  .04 .34* 
19. IAT -.02 -.22 -.08 -.01 -.02 .17 -.01 .07  .01 
20. Defensive Dismissal -.10 -.26† -.27* .31* .29* .25† .15 .40** -.11 
21. Acculturation .12 -.16 -.15 -.18 .45*** .00 .13 .26* -.06 .11 
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Table 7 Continued 
Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
      21.  
1.  Self-esteem (Trait) a  
2.  Self-esteem (State)  a 
3.  Perform (SSE)  a  
4.  Social (SSE)  a  
5.  Appearance (SSE) a 
6.  Behavior and Character (Honor) a 
7.  Status and Respect (Honor) a.     
8.  Helping Others (Honor)  a  
9.  Convictions and Pride (Honor)  a  
10. Dishonor (Honor) a  
11. Physical Development (Personal) a  
12. Creativity (Personal) a   
13. Intellectualism (Personal) a  
14. Anger (Face Perception Task) a  
15. Disgust (Face Perception Task) a  
16. Anxiety (Face Perception Task) a  
17. Pride (Face Perception Task) a  
18. Shame (Face Perception Task) a  
19. IAT a  
20. Defensive Dismissal a  
21. Acculturation 
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Table 7 Continued 
Correlations among Variables in Session 2. Values above the Diagonal are for the Dignity Sample and Values below the Diagonal 
are for the Honor Sample 
Note:  
Self-esteem (Trait)= Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale score; Self-esteem (State)=Overall score on Heatherton and Polivy's 
(1991)  state self-esteem scale (SSES); Perform = Performance subscale of SSES; Social = Social subscale of SSES; Appearance = 
Appearance subscale of SSES; Behavior and Character = Behavior and character (core) subscale of Honor Values Scale (HVS); 
Status and Respect = Status and respect subscale of HVS; Helping Others = Helping others subscale of HVS; Convictions and 
Pride = Convictions and pride subscale of HVS; Dishonor = Dishonor subscale of HVS; Physical Development = Physical 
Development subscale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale (PVS); Creativity = Creativity subscale of PVS; Intellectualism = 
Intellectualism subscale of PVS; Anger = Anger score on Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT); Disgust = Disgust score on 
FEPT; Anxiety = Anxiety score on FEPT; Pride = Pride score on FEPT; Shame = Shame score on FEPT; IAT=Implicit shame as 
measured with Impilicit Association Task; Defensive Dismissal = Defensive dismissal of the negative feedback, 
Acculturation=Score on the acculturation scale. 
a. Not computed because “Acculturation” is constant. 
†p<.1, *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Results Concerning the Main Hypothesis 
We predicted that honor culture participants who engage in honor-affirmation in the 
core honor domain about which they were insulted will experience less shame compared to 
honor culture participants who engage in self-affirmation. Dignity culture participants who 
engage in honor-affirmation and self-affirmation will experience similar amounts of shame.  
Shame was measured in two ways: First, with the implicit association test and second, with 
the facial emotions recognition task. This hypothesis was tested for both of these measures 
separately.  
In order to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders differed 
on shame as a function of affirmation, two separate 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 
(culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) 
ANCOVAs with the baseline score for each corresponding measure as covariate were carried 
out. Three way interactions were not significant for either of the shame measures (IAT and 
facial emotions perception task).1 Therefore, scores of the two honor samples were collapsed 
for the main analyses and gender was not controlled. For each test a hierarchical regression 
analysis was performed controlling for baseline levels of shame (time 1 score of the 
corresponding measure) and age of the participant. The reason we included age as a control 
variable is the significant age difference between the honor and dignity sample. 
Shame Measured with IAT 
In order to examine the effects of culture and affirmation interaction, a three-step 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted.  In the first step implicit shame was regressed 
on the control variables (age and baseline shame measured in session 1 with IAT). This 
analysis revealed that control variables were not significantly related to implicit shame. In the 
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second step, culture and affirmation were added. As seen in Table 8, none of the predictors 
made a unique, significant contribution to the prediction of implicit shame. Finally, the third 
step which included the interaction term did not improve the results. Means estimated after 
controlling for age and baseline shame are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1  
Mean Shame Scores Measured with IAT for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor 
Affirmation Conditions (N=116) 
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Note. 
Mean IAT score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline shame: -.42, age: 21.99
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Table 8 
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Shame as Assessed by IAT (N=116) 
         Step 1      Step 2    Step 3 
Predictor              B       SE B      β             R2            B     SE B      β              ∆R2        B       SE B       β         ∆R2  
    .02    .01 .00 
Baseline Shame .10 .08 .12  .10 .08 .12  .09 .08 .12  
Age -.00 .01 -.02  -.00 .01 -.03  -.00 .01 -.03 
Culture     .02 .08 .02  .06 .11 .08 
Affirmation    -.05 .07 -.06  -.00 .10 -.01  
Culture X Affirmation       -.09 .14 -.10 
R2  .02 .02  .02         
F .89 .55 .51 
Note.  
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation
63 
 
  
Shame Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task 
Similar to the previous analyses, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis to 
test the effects of culture and affirmation interaction. In the first step, implicit shame 
(measured with facial emotions perception task) was regressed on the control variables. As 
seen in Table 9, session 1 shame made a unique significant contribution to the explanation of 
shame in the second session. Higher baseline levels of implicit shame predicted higher 
implicit shame after the manipulation.  In the second step, culture and affirmation were added 
to the model. The linear combination of the predictors was significantly related to implicit 
shame; however, neither culture nor affirmation made contributions to the explanation of 
shame. Finally, the interaction term was added to the model. The interaction term was not 
significant. These analyses did not support our hypotheses which predicted an interaction of 
culture and affirmation.  Means estimated after controlling for age and baseline shame are 
presented in Figure 2. 
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Table 9 
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Shame as Assessed by Facial Emotions 
Perception Task (N=115) 
         Step 1      Step 2    Step 3 
Predictor            B       SE B        β              R2            B      SE B       β              ∆R2            B        SE B       β             ∆R2   
    .57***    .00    .00 
Baseline Shame .79 .07 .74***  .79 .07 .74***  .79 .07 .74***  
Age -.02 .02 -.07  -.02 .02 -.06  -.02 .02 -.06 
Culture     -.03 .16 -.02  -.06 .20 -.03 
Affirmation    -.06 .13 -.03  -.10 .19 -.04  
Culture X Affirmation       .07 .27 .03 
R2  .57 .58  .58         
F 75.47*** 37.20*** 29.52*** 
Note.  
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation 
***p<.001
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Figure 2  
Mean Shame Scores Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT) for the Two 
Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=115) 
 
 
Note. 
Mean shame score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline shame: 2.71, age: 21.97 
 
Results Concerning the Secondary Hypotheses 
We had several secondary hypotheses concerning outcomes other than shame. First, 
we predicted that the honor participants who receive honor-affirmation would experience less 
anger compared to their counterparts who receive self-affirmation. No such difference was 
expected for the dignity sample between honor-affirmation and self-affirmation groups 
(Hypotheses 3 & 4). We also predicted that honor participants in the self-affirmation 
condition would demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult (Hypothesis 5) and 
higher levels of reactive honor endorsement (Hypothesis 6) compared to honor participants in 
the self-affirmation condition. Again, no such difference was expected for the dignity 
sample.  
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To test for these hypotheses, we followed a plan of analyses that was very similar to 
the analysis of the main hypothesis. For each test, we first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor 
and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and 
female) ANCOVAs to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders 
differed on each dependent variable as a function of affirmation. Then, we conducted 
hierarchical regression analyses to test the hypotheses controlling for baseline levels of each 
specific measure and age of the participants.  
Anger 
As stated earlier, we expected honor participants who receive honor-affirmation to 
experience less anger compared to honor participants who receive self-affirmation. Dignity 
culture participants who receive honor-affirmation and self-affirmation were expected to 
experience similar amounts of anger (Hypotheses 3 & 4).  
In order to examine whether or not the two honor culture groups and genders differed 
on anger as a function of affirmation, we first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 
(culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) 
ANCOVA with anger (measured with facial emotions perception task) as the dependent 
variable. The three-way interaction was not significant.2 Therefore, scores of the two honor 
samples were collapsed for the main analysis and gender was not controlled.  
We conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis in which the implicit anger 
was regressed on the control variables (baseline anger assessed in session1 and age) as the 
first step. As seen in Table 10, baseline anger made a unique significant contribution to the 
explanation of second session implicit anger, such that greater implicit anger at the first 
session predicted greater implicit anger in the second session. In the second step culture and 
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affirmation and in the third step the interaction term was added to the model. Neither the 
main effects of culture and affirmation, nor the interaction term reached significance. Means 
estimated after controlling for age and baseline anger are presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3  
Mean Anger Scores Measured with Facial Emotions Perception Task (FEPT) for the Two 
Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=113) 
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Note. 
Mean anger score is evaluated at the following values: Baseline anger: 2.93, age: 22.03 
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Table 10 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Implicit Anger Assessed with Facial Emotions Perception Task 
(N=113) 
         Step 1      Step 2    Step 3 
Predictor             B       SE B       β              R2            B      SE B       β               ∆R2           B       SE B       β             ∆R2 
    .39***    .00    .01 
Baseline Anger .56 .07 .61***  .58 .07 .62***  .57 .07 .62*** 
Age -.01 .01 -.07  -.02 .01 -.10  -.02 .01 -.10 
Culture     -.09 .12 -.07  .12 .15 .09 
Affirmation     .04 .10 .03  .08 .15 .06  
Culture X Affirmation       -.06 .21 -.04 
R2  .39 .39  .39         
F 35.56*** 17.78*** 14.12*** 
Note.  
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation 
***p<.001 
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Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult 
We predicted that honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition would 
demonstrate more defensive dismissal of the insult compared to honor culture participants in 
the self-affirmation condition. No such difference was expected in the dignity culture sample 
(Hypothesis 5). Defensive dismissal of the honor insult was calculated by averaging the 
scores of the last four questions of the final evaluation form. These questions asked how 
helpful and accurate the feedback was, to what degree the participants agreed with the 
personality feedback, and whether or not participants would consider taking the feedback 
into account for self-improvement purposes. Higher scores indicate higher endorsement of 
the feedback. Therefore, the scores were reversed before the dismissal score was obtained. 
Thus, higher scores indicate higher levels of dismissal. 
We first conducted 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o 
honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with anger (measured 
with facial emotions perception task) as the dependent variable. The three-way interaction 
was not significant.3 Therefore, scores of the two honor samples were collapsed for the main 
analysis and gender was not controlled. Because defensive dismissal was measured only in 
the second session, the only control variable was age. 
In the first step of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis, age did not make a 
unique significant contribution to the explanation of defensive dismissal. As seen in Table 
11, culture made a unique significant contribution to the prediction of dismissal, such that 
being a member of the dignity culture predicted higher levels of defensive dismissal of the 
honor insult. In the final step, the interaction term was marginally significant. 
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Table 11 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult (N=112) 
         Step 1      Step 2    Step 3 
Predictor               B        SE B       β  R2       B   SE B      β            ∆R2          B       SE B       β  ∆R2     
    .00    .08**    .03† 
Age .01 .03 .03  .06 .04 .16  .05 .04 .16 
Culture     -.77 .28 -.28**  -1.22 .37 -.45** 
Affirmation     -.39 .25 -.14  -.85 .35 -.31* 
Culture X Affirmation       .94 .49 .30† 
R2  .00 .08 .11         
F .11 3.31* 3.44* 
Note.  
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01
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To examine whether or not the marginal interaction was in the hypothesized 
direction, we conducted simple slope analyses for the within culture comparison conditions. 
The results revealed that, participants in the dignity sample dismissed the honor insult more 
after honor-affirmation compared to self-affirmation, bdignity culture = .87, t(54)=2.58, p=.013. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, for the honor sample the slope of affirmation was not 
significantly different than 0, bhonor culture=-.09, t(52)=.-24, p=.809. These simple slope 
analyses did not support our hypotheses. Means estimated after controlling for age are 
presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4  
Mean Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult for the Two Cultures across Self and Honor 
Affirmation Conditions (N=112) 
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Note. 
Mean dismissal is evaluated at age: 21.71 
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Reactive Honor Endorsement 
We predicted that the honor sample in the self-affirmation condition would 
demonstrate higher levels of reactive honor endorsement in the core honor aspect compared 
to honor sample in the honor-affirmation condition. No such difference was expected in the 
dignity sample. Reactive honor endorsement is defined as the increase in score of behavior 
and character subscale (Core subscale) of the honor values scale from session 1 to session 2.  
First, we conducted a 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o 
honor and Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with core honor 
endorsement as the dependent variable. Baseline levels of core honor endorsement and age of 
participants were controlled. As displayed in Table 12, controlling for baseline honor 
endorsement and age, main effect of affirmation was significant such that participants in the 
self-affirmation condition had higher honor endorsement scores (M=6.52) compared to 
participants in the honor-affirmation condition (M=6.30). Also, affirmation by culture and 
affirmation by gender interactions were statistically significant. 
Table 12 
Summary of ANCOVA Results for Reactive Honor Endorsement (N=115) 
           df1  df2          F        partial η2       p         
Core1  1 101 47.93  .32 .00 
Age  1 101 .24 .00 .63 
Culture  2 101  .11 .00 .90 
Gender  1 101  .09 .00 .76 
Affirmation   1 101 7.34 .07 .01 
Affirmation X Gender   1 101 5.17 .05 .03 
Affirmation X Culture  2 101 6.13 .11 .00 
Culture X Gender  2 101  2.54 .05 .08 
Culture X Gender X Affirmation 2 101  .06 .00  .94 
Note. 
Core1 = Session 1 endorsement of core honor values 
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In order to examine the nature of culture by affirmation interaction, we conducted 
three separate simple slopes analyses. For the dignity sample, the slope of affirmation was 
not significantly different than 0, bdignity sample =.07, t(52)=.71, p=.479. The Latina/o honor 
sample experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition 
compared to honor-affirmation condition, bLatina/o sample=-.60, t(27)=-4.39, p=.000. For the 
Turkish honor sample, the slope of affirmation was not significantly different than 0, bTurkish 
sample =.-04, t(21)=-.214, p=.833. Means are presented in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 
Mean Reactive Honor Endorsement for the Dignity, Latina/o Honor and Turkish Honor 
Cultures across Self and Honor Affirmation Conditions (N=115) 
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Note. 
Mean reactive honor endorsement is evaluated at the following values: Baseline endorsement 
of core honor values: 6.31 and age: 21.97 
 
 This analysis partially supported our interaction hypothesis by showing that Latina/o 
participants engaged in reactive endorsement of the core honor value more in the self-
affirmation condition than in honor-affirmation condition. However, our honor sample is not 
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composed of only Latino participants, and Turkish participants did not show the same 
hypothesized effect. However, the direction of the effect (negative betas) was similar in both 
Latina/o and Turkish samples. Turkish participants had a very slight and non-significant 
tendency to score higher on reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition than 
in honor-affirmation condition. In other words, Turkish sample did not show an opposite 
pattern to the Latina/o sample. Therefore, we combined the two honor cultures and repeated 
the simple slope analysis for the honor sample. Participants in the combined honor sample 
experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to 
honor-affirmation condition, bhonor sample=-.34, t(27)=-2.87, p=.006.  
Following this, we examined the gender by affirmation interaction by conducting two 
separate simple slopes analyses. Male participants experienced more reactive honor 
endorsement in the self-affirmation condition compared to honor-affirmation condition, 
bmale=-.37, t(42)=-3.14, p=.003. For female participants, the slope of affirmation was not 
significantly different than 0, bfemale =.02, t(61)=.15, p=.884. Means are presented in Figure 6. 
Because neither culture by gender interaction nor the three-way interaction was significant, 
we did not further examine gender differences.  
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Figure 6 
Mean Reactive Honor Endorsement for Male and Females across Self and Honor 
Affirmation Conditions (N=115) 
 
 
 
Note. 
Mean reactive honor endorsement is evaluated at the following values: Baseline endorsement 
of core honor values: 6.31 age: 21.97 
 
 
Exploratory Analyses 
Emotions Related to Honor  
Although we did not have any specific predictions concerning how self versus honor 
affirmation would affect the emotions of participants other than shame and anger after an 
honor insult, we measured anxiety, disgust and pride levels in sessions 1 and 2 with the facial 
emotions perception task. It is plausible that some of these implicit emotion scores would be 
affected by the culture of the participants, the kind of affirmation they engage in, or the 
interaction of the two.  
In order to explore these possibilities, three separate hierarchical regression analyses 
was carried out for each of these emotions (i.e., anxiety, disgust and pride) as outcomes. In 
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all of these analyses, the outcome emotion was first regressed on its baseline level (session 1 
score), gender, and age as control variables. The variables of interest, culture and affirmation 
was entered into the model in the second step. And finally, the interaction term was added. 
As displayed in Table 13, baseline levels of each emotion made significant 
contributions to the explanation of Session 2 levels. Culture made a unique, significant 
contribution to the explanation of anxiety, such that being a member of the honor culture was 
associated with higher implicit anxiety. For pride and disgust, the main effect of culture was 
not significant. In none of these three models, was the culture by affirmation interaction 
significant. 
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Table 13 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Implicit Anxiety, Disgust and Pride (N=115) 
                  Step 1      Step 2                     Step 3 
Outcome Predictor     B        SE B       β   R2           B        SE B       β            ∆R2         B       SE B       β          ∆R2            
Anxiety    .61***    .03*    .00 
                    Baseline Anxiety .78 .06 .77***  .74 .06 .73***  .75 .07 .74*** 
 Gender -.11 .11 -.06  -.14 .11 -.08  -.14 .11 -.08 
 Age -.00 .01 -.01  -.02 .01 -.10  -.02 .01 -.10  
 Culture     .35 .12 .20**  .30 .16 .17†
 Affirmation     -.09 .10 -.05  -.13 .15 -.08 
 Culture X Affirmation       .09 .21 .05 
 R2 .61 .64 .64 
 F 56.67*** 37.89*** 31.32*** 
Disgust     .55***    .00    .00 
 Baseline Disgust .69 .07 .67***  .69 .07 .67***  .68 .07 .66*** 
 Gender -.04 .13 -.02  -.04 .13 -.02  -.04 .13 -.02  
 Age -.04 .02 -.17*  -.05 .02 -.19*  -.05 .02 -.19* 
 Culture      .10 .15 .05  .22 .20 .11 
 Affirmation      -.03 .13 -.01  .15 .19 .07 
 Culture X Affirmation       -.24 .26 -.10 
 R2 .55 .57 .57 
 F 33.22***   23.49*** 20.46*** 
Pride    .39***    .01    .00 
 Baseline Pride .58 .07 .62***  .59 .07 .63***  .59 .07 .63*** 
 Gender -.16 .15 -.08  -.17 .15 -.09  -.17 .15 -.09 
 Age -.02 .02 -.09  -.03 .02 -.14  -.03 .02 -.14  
 Culture     .18 .17 .09  .17 .22 .09
 Affirmation     -.03 .14 -.02  -.04 .21 -.02 
 Culture X Affirmation       .01 .29 .00 
 R2 .39 .40 .40 
 F 24.06***   14.56*** 12.02*** 
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Table 13 Continued 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Implicit Anxiety, Disgust and Pride (N=115) 
Note.  
Gender coded as 0=male and 1=female 
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation 
† p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Self-Esteem 
Trait self-esteem. We measured self-esteem of participants with Rosenberg’s self-
esteem scale (1965) in both sessions. Examination of Tables 6 and 7 reveals interesting 
relationships between trait self-esteem and aspects of the honor constructs. For the honor 
sample, baseline level of trait self-esteem has marginally significant positive correlations 
with the behavior and character (core) and convictions and pride aspects of honor. For the 
dignity sample, however, the baseline level of trait self-esteem is significantly correlated with 
the convictions and pride aspects of honor (Table 6). In the second session, trait self-esteem 
is significantly correlated with all of five of the honor aspects in the honor sample. For the 
dignity sample, however, trait self-esteem is significantly correlated only with the 
convictions and pride aspects of honor (Table 7). 
This pattern suggests that culture of the participants and the kind of affirmation they 
engage in might influence their second session trait self-esteem in different ways. To 
examine these possibilities, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis. In the first step, 
session 2 self-esteem was regressed on baseline self-esteem, gender and age as control 
variables. In the second step, culture and affirmation and in the third step the interaction term 
was added. The results revealed that only baseline self-esteem made a unique, significant 
contribution to the explanation of self-esteem in the second session. Neither the main effects 
of culture and affirmation, nor the interaction was significant (Table 14).  
State Self-Esteem. We measured state self-esteem of participants using Heatherton 
and Polivy’s (1991) State Self-esteem Scale (SSES). SSES has three subscales: Performance, 
social and appearance self-esteem. To explore changes in subscale scores of SSES, we 
regressed session 2 scores of each subscale on its corresponding session 1 scores, and saved 
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the standardized residuals. These three residual scores were used as the outcome variables in 
a 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 2 (culture: dignity and honor) factorial MANCOVA with 
age and gender as covariates. 
The overall test was significant for the effect of culture (Table 15). Given this pattern, 
univariate effects of culture were examined. As presented in Table 16, the main effect of 
culture was significant for performance and appearance subscales of SSES, such that honor 
culture participants increased their scores on these subscales from the first to the second 
session more than the dignity culture participants did, irrespective of the affirmation they 
received.
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Table 14 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predictors of Trait Self-Esteem (N=115) 
         Step 1      Step 2    Step 3 
Predictor              B       SE B      β              R2            B     SE B      β              ∆R2        B       SE B       β         ∆R2 
    .53    .01    .00 
Baseline Self-Esteem .75 .07 .73***   .75 .07 .73***  .75 .07 .73*** 
Gender -.03 .12 -.02  -.02 .12 -.01  -.02 .12 -.01 
Age .00 .01 .00  .01 .02 .04  .01 .02 .04 
Culture     -.11 .13 -.06  -.12 .18 -.07 
Affirmation     .16 .12 .09  .16 .17 .09 
Culture X Affirmation         .01 .23 .00 
R2 .53    .55    .55 
F  42.29*** 26.06*** 21.52*** 
Note.  
Gender coded as 0=male and 1=female 
Culture coded as 0=Dignity culture and 1= honor culture 
Affirmation coded as 0=honor-affirmation and 1=self-affirmation 
***p<.001
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Table 15 
Summary of Results for the Multivariate Effects (N=114) 
Effect        Λ   F    df1       df2               p        partial η2 
Gender  .99 .49 3 106 .69 .01 
Age .98 .86 3 106 .46 .02 
Affirmation  .98 .79 3 106 .50 .02 
Culture .92 2.99 3 106 .03 .08  
Affirmation X Culture .98 .59 3 106 .63 .02  
 
Table 16 
Univariate Effects for Culture (N=114) 
Effect       MS   F    df1       df2               p        partial η2 
Performance Subscale  5.27 5.89 1 108 .02 .05 
Social Subscale  .93 1.07 1 108 .30 .01 
Appearance Subscale 5.11 5.90 1 108 .02 .05 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
In this study we compared honor-affirmation and self-affirmation in terms of their 
potency to reduce the negative effects of receiving an honor insult for members of dignity 
versus honor cultures. These negative effects included negative emotions such as shame, 
anger and anxiety, and a drop in self-esteem. We were also interested in defensive coping 
mechanisms after receiving an honor insult. These included dismissal of the insult and 
reactive endorsement of the honor values in order to avoid the negative emotional 
consequences by re-instilling a sense of having honor values. The honor cultures that we 
examined were Turkish and Latino cultures and the dignity culture was the U. S. Midwest.  
 
Emotional Consequences of Honor Insults 
Shame 
In this study, our main outcome of interest was shame. It is assumed that offenses to 
honor would elicit shame in people who are subjected to such insults (e.g., Casimir, 2009; 
Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Following 
this widely held assumption in the literature, we hypothesized that honor culture participants 
who engage in honor-affirmation would experience less shame compared to honor culture 
participants who engage in self-affirmation. We did not envision such a difference for the 
dignity sample. We assumed that for members of dignity cultures, honor is not such a distinct 
construct, but just one component of self-worth, not so different than feelings of self-esteem 
or competency. Therefore, the negative effects of an honor-insult can be alleviated equally 
well by self-affirmation and honor-affirmation.  
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We measured shame in two ways: The Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the facial emotions perception task that we created by 
adapting a projection task used by Ijzerman et al. (2007). Unfortunately, analyses with none 
of these measures supported our interaction hypothesis. This can mean three things. First, it 
might indicate that honor and self-affirmation are equally effective in reducing shame after 
the honor insult. This can be concluded based on the assumption that the honor insult created 
shame to begin with. This brings us to the second possibility, that our manipulation was not 
effective in eliciting shame in participants. And finally, the third possibility is that 
participants experienced shame but our measures were not appropriate or adequate to capture 
shame.  
Unfortunately, we could not include a control condition where participants did not 
have the opportunity to engage in any kind of affirmation. The number of available Turkish 
participants was severely restricted and creating comparable lab environments necessary for 
carrying out the experiment in other locations was not economically feasible. Therefore, our 
design allowed us to test only the interaction hypothesis, and it cannot differentiate between 
the first and the second possibilities. In other words, we cannot truly test whether similar 
shame levels in two sessions were due to a reduction in shame by both honor and self-
affirmation, or due to an ineffective manipulation.  
The third possibility is that the measures we used were not valid measures of shame. 
Since its introduction, the IAT has been frequently used in research examining a variety of 
constructs such as aggression (e.g., Uhlmann & Swanson, 2004), attitude-behavior 
consistency (Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001), and self-esteem (Greenwald & 
Farnham, 2000). In the realm of emotions, Egloff and Schmukle (2002) showed its internal 
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consistency and predictive validity for assessing anxiety. More recently, it was used to assess 
shame successfully with a German sample (Rusch et al., 2007). Although IAT’s effectiveness 
in assessing emotions is shown, to our knowledge, there is no study that showed its ability to 
capture experimentally induced changes in emotions over a short period of time.  
The other measure we used to assess shame (as well as anger, anxiety, disgust, and 
pride) was the facial emotions perception task. This measure was adapted from Ijzerman et 
al. (2007). Ijzerman et al. (2007) was successful in measuring the anger of participants in an 
honor threatening situation using a version of this test. However, we used different stimuli 
(faces depicting several emotions) and aimed to measure a greater number of emotions. We 
used multiple stimuli (8 to 7 images per emotion) to control for variance in the potency of 
each image to elicit the emotion in question, and obtained acceptable reliability scores. 
However, because we did not validate our scale, we cannot eliminate the possibility of 
inadequate construct validity. 
Anger and Other Emotions Related to Honor 
Similar to shame, we hypothesized that honor culture participants who engage in 
honor-affirmation would experience less anger compared to honor culture participants who 
engage in self-affirmation. We did not expect any such difference for the dignity sample. We 
measured anger with the facial emotions perception task. Unfortunately, the expected 
interaction effect was not observed. 
Although we did not set any specific hypotheses for affirmation’s role in affecting 
anxiety, disgust, or pride, we repeated the analyses for these three emotions for exploratory 
purposes. Just like the case with shame and anger, we did not obtain any significant 
interaction effects. 
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The three possible interpretations of these results described in our discussion of 
results for shame also holds true for anger, anxiety, disgust and pride. Regrettably, our design 
does not allow for testing whether honor and self-affirmation were equally effective in 
reducing these emotions (increasing it in the case of pride), or our manipulation was not 
effective in eliciting them to begin with.  
 
Defensive Coping Mechanisms 
Defensive Dismissal of the Honor Insult 
One of the defensive coping mechanisms that we were interested in was dismissal of 
the honor insult. In line with our previous hypotheses, we predicted that honor culture 
participants in the self-affirmation condition would demonstrate more defensive dismissal of 
the insult compared to honor culture participants in the self-affirmation condition. No such 
difference was expected in the dignity culture sample. Our results did not support this 
hypothesis. We obtained a marginally significant interaction effect which was not in the 
expected direction. Participants in the honor culture sample did not differ in their dismissal of 
the honor insult across the self and honor-affirmation conditions.  
Reactive Honor Endorsement 
The second defensive coping mechanism that we were interested in was reactive 
endorsement of the specific honor value that was insulted. When the two honor samples 
(Latina/o and Turkish) were combined for the analyses, our results showed that honor culture 
participants experienced more reactive honor endorsement in the self-affirmation condition 
compared to the honor-affirmation condition. There were no differences for the dignity 
culture participants between self and honor-affirmation conditions. At first glance, these 
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results seems to support our hypothesis by indicating that for members of honor cultures, 
self-affirmation is not as effective as honor-affirmation in alleviating negative consequences 
of receiving an honor insult, and thus, defensive mechanisms are present after self-
affirmation. For members of a dignity culture, engaging in self-affirmation and honor-
affirmation does not make a difference.  
However, this pattern was observed only for Latina/o sample. Participants in the 
Turkish sample did not differ in reactive honor endorsement across self and honor 
affirmation conditions. This observation was surprising for a couple of reasons. It should be 
recalled that the current Latina/o sample scored significantly higher on the measure of 
acculturation to North America compared to the Turkish sample. If anything, this would 
suggest that Turkish participants would endorse honor values more than the Latina/o 
participants who are acculturated to a dignity culture. On the other hand, some characteristics 
of the Turkish sample might provide some insight into this situation. The current Turkish 
sample was much more homogenous than the Latina/o sample in that they were mostly 
international graduate students who came to study in US recently. This might imply that they 
are coming from the least traditional segment of the Turkish society, and that they are 
embrace Western values more than their peers in their homeland. Latina/o sample, on the 
other hand, was more heterogeneous in this respect. It included not only international 
students, but also Latina/o Americans who were born in the US or migrated to this country 
early in their life. In other words, they would not necessarily be the least traditional members 
of their cultural group.  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the sample sizes of each honor sample 
were very small (N= 32 for Latina/o sample and N=27 for Turkish sample) compared to the 
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dignity culture (N= 57). Therefore, any results comparing the two honor cultures should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
Self-Esteem 
All of the aforementioned interaction hypotheses were based upon our general 
assumption that honor is a distinct and prominent element of self-worth for members of 
honor cultures, and that it is different than self-esteem. Therefore, mending hurt self-esteem 
would not help repair hurt honor. For members of the dignity cultures, self-affirmation would 
work just as well as honor-affirmation, because having a sense of honor is not more 
important than having self-esteem in determining self-worth.  
Supposing that our general assumption (that honor and self-esteem are distinct for 
honor culture participants) is correct, then, it could be assumed that self-esteem of members 
of honor cultures would not be affected at all by an honor insult. Self-esteem of members of 
dignity cultures, on the other hand, would be negatively affected by an honor insult because 
honor is a component of self-esteem, which is not more important than other components. 
For these reasons, in our design, we can expect no differences in self-esteem after the 
affirmation manipulation for both cultures. In the honor sample, post-manipulation self-
esteem should not be any different for honor versus self-affirmation conditions because 
supposedly, it was not affected by the honor insult. Self-esteem of dignity culture 
participants, on the other hand, should not show a difference between self and honor-
affirmation conditions for a very different reason: They would work equally well to repair the 
hurt self-esteem. In other words, a non-significant culture by honor interaction would be 
expected; however, the reason for this nonsignificant interaction cannot be discerned without 
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a no-affirmation control group. Thus, in the case of self-esteem it would not be possible for 
us to interpret the interaction effect whether or not it was significant.  
Nevertheless, we carried out our analyses for exploratory purposes, and we obtained a 
surprising result. Performance and appearance aspects of state self-esteem scale among honor 
culture participants were elevated more from the baseline to the post-manipulation sessions 
compared to dignity culture participants. What is more interesting is the fact that this increase 
(relative to the dignity sample) is not observed in the social aspect of state self-esteem 
(theoretically most relevant to honor values), but in the performance and appearance aspects, 
which should theoretically be unrelated to honor values in honor cultures. However, as 
mentioned before, it is not possible to draw conclusions without a control group. 
 
Implications 
Previous social psychological studies of honor focused on emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioral consequences of perceiving an honor threat (e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Fischer et al, 
1999; Ijzerman et al. 2007). Before the current study, possible ways of re-instilling honor and 
thus avoiding the negative emotional consequences of losing honor have not been 
systematically tested. Even though the current study did not provide support for the 
hypothesis that honor-affirmation could act against honor offenses and reduce negative 
emotions, it revealed interesting possibilities about the issue of defensive mechanisms 
following an offense. 
It has been observed in previous self-affirmation research that people engage in 
dismissal of negative or risky information pertaining to self when they do not have an 
opportunity to affirm their self-value (Sherman et al., 2000). As far as we are aware, this is 
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the only study to examine such defensive mechanisms in the context of honor. One important 
contribution of this research to the existing literature is to experimentally demonstrate the 
effectiveness of honor-affirmation by showing that reactive honor endorsement is much 
lower after honor-affirmation compare to self-affirmation (at least for one of our honor 
samples). This point is also in favor of our general assumption that self-esteem and sense of 
honor are distinct constructs for members of honor cultures. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
As mentioned before, one big limitation of this study is the lack of a control group 
that went through the same manipulation without having the opportunity to engage in any 
kind of affirmation after receiving the honor insult. This lack prevented us from examining 
the reasons for failure to find significant culture by affirmation interactions. Moreover, it 
does not allow us to draw meaningful conclusions from many significant cultural differences 
we observed. For instance, honor culture participants scored lower than the dignity culture 
participants on defensive dismissal of the insult irrespective of the affirmation they engaged 
in. We cannot determine whether or not such a difference would still hold true if there was a 
third group of honor culture participants who did not receive affirmation. 
Another important technical limitation was related to the methods of participant 
recruitment. Due to limited availability of the honor sample participants in psychology 
participant pool, we had to gather international students by offering them monetary 
compensation. One could argue that monetary compensation is a stronger incentive than 
course credit, which would cause the honor sample participants to be more engaged and 
motivated during the procedure. Another result of not gathering the honor sample from 
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psychology participant pool was the higher average age of the honor sample participants 
compared to dignity sample participants. One could argue that endorsement of cultural values 
increases with age, and therefore any observed difference might be due to age differences of 
the samples.  
On a more conceptual note, in order to more fully explore the relationships between 
the concepts of self-esteem and honor, future studies should employ more complete designs 
that not only vary the affirmation condition, but also the type of insult. A design such as the 
current one can potentially answer the question of whether or not self-affirmation can restore 
a sense of honor for members of honor culture. However, designs that vary the kind of insult 
would also be able to demonstrate whether honor-affirmation can restore self-esteem for 
members of honor culture. In our opinion, it should not. However, only a complete design 
can truly differentiate the effects of honor and self-esteem on the overall sense of self-worth 
for members of honor cultures. 
Another important issue that future studies can address is the relative importance of 
core versus peripheral aspects of honor. We assumed a priori that core aspects of honor 
would be more potent in creating a negative impact if insulted, and that an insult to this 
aspect can be rebuffed only by addressing that aspect directly. For this reason, the honor 
offense we exposed our participants was in the core domain, and the hypothesis concerning 
reactive honor endorsement was measured using this domain. Yet, our results also showed 
that participants engaged in reactive endorsement of a peripheral honor aspect after receiving 
the insult in the core domain. This opens up important possibilities for future research. An 
experiment in which the honor insult and the honor affirmation are varied across all honor 
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aspects would demonstrate whether or not the core aspect of honor is truly irreplaceable and 
most important of the honor aspects as the anthropology literature suggests. 
 
Conclusions 
In honor cultures, retaliation is a duty when one's self or family is insulted. Failure to 
do so would indicate accepting the insult and admitting that one is not worthy of honor. 
When the insult is perceived as justified, such as when a female member of the family 
engages in a pre-marital affair, the consequences would be grave: This female might be 
killed by her own family members in the name honor, be forced to commit suicide, or be 
disowned by the family. Willingness of people in honor cultures to take such radical 
measures point to the fact that consequences of losing honor would be very negative. When 
one does not have the ability or opportunity to take appropriate action, one would lose social 
reputation, and experience debilitating emotions such as shame, anger, and anxiety. 
Returning to the hypothetical siblings we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Ahmet 
punches one of the guys who verbally insulted his sister, Zeynep, in order to prevent a deep 
sense of shame that he and his sister would feel. Even though the current study did not 
provide evidence supporting the idea that honor-affirmation could act against honor offenses 
by reducing negative emotions, it revealed interesting possibilities about the issue of 
defensive mechanisms following an offense. It is hoped that future theoretical and applied 
research will demonstrate the ways in which honor-affirmation can be implemented to 
prevent honor related aggression in honor cultures. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and 
Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with IAT as the dependent 
variable did not reveal a significant three-way interaction of gender by culture by 
affirmation, F(2, 103)=.69, p=.50. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, 
culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, F(2, 103)=.29, p=.75; 
F(2, 103)=.19, p=.83; and F(1, 103)=.10, p=.75, respectively. Similarly, results of the 2 
by 3 by 2 ANCOVA with shame assessed with facial emotions perception task as the 
dependent variable did not reveal a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 103)=1.03, 
p=.36. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and 
affirmation by gender were not significant, F(2, 102)=.03, p=.97; F(2, 102)=2.76, p=.07; 
and F(1, 102)=1.30, p=.26, respectively. 
2. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and 
Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with anger (measured with 
facial emotions perception task) as the dependent variable, and age and Session 1 anger 
as covariates, did not reveal a significant three-way interaction of gender by culture by 
affirmation, F(2, 99)=1.00, p=.37. Also, two way interactions of culture by affirmation, 
culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were not significant, F(2, 99)=.02, p=.98 
F(2, 99)=2.46, p=.09, F(1, 101)=.01, p=.92, respectively.  
3. Results of the 2 (affirmation: honor and self) by 3 (culture: dignity, Latina/o honor and 
Turkish honor) by 2 (gender: male and female) ANCOVA with defensive dismissal score 
as the dependent variable, and age as the covariate did not reveal a significant three-way 
interaction of gender by culture by affirmation, F(2, 99)=2.50, p=.09. Also, two way 
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interactions of culture by affirmation, culture by gender, and affirmation by gender were 
not significant, F(2, 99)=2.00, p=.14, F(2, 99)=1.23, p=.30, F(1, 101)=1.30, p=.26, 
respectively.  
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APPENDIX A: MEASURES USED IN SESSION 1  
Demographic Information Form 
1. What is your gender?:  Female Male  
 
2. What is your age?:   ___________________ 
 
3. Please indicate the average income level of your immediate family. 
1- $25,000 or less   6 - $65,001 - $75,000 
2- $25,001 - $35,000   7-  $75,001 - $85,000 
3- $35,001 - $45,000   8 - $85,001 - $95,001 
4- $45,001 - $55,000              9-  $95,001 - $105,000 
5- $55,001-$65,000              10- $105,001 and above 
 
4. What is your family's socioeconomic status? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
     very            middle                 very  
     poor              class            wealthy 
 
5. How would you characterize your upbringing? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
     very                             very 
     rural                           urban 
 
6. What is your country of origin?  _______________________ 
 
7. Which of the following best represents your ethnic or cultural background? 
1- Caucasian American/White   6 - Native American 
2- African American/Black   7-  Alaskan Native 
3- Latino (a) American/Hispanic  8 - International Student 
4- Asian American/Pacific Islander  9-  Other. Please specify 
5- Multi-racial American                                         _________________              
 
8. In the place provided below, please indicate each place you lived in for more than 6 
months. Specify the names of the town/city, and country, and indicate the years of your 
residence in that place. 
 
For instance: 
Town/City: Chicago, State: Illinois, Country: USA, Years: 1987-1999 
Town/City: London, State: N/A, Country: England, Years: 1999-2007 
Town/City: Ames, State: Iowa, Country: USA, Years: 2007-present 
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9. What is your first language or mother tongue? 
 1. English 
                  2. English plus another language (bi-lingual). Please specify_______________ 
                  3. Other. Please specify ____________________ 
 
10. How often do you speak English when you are with your friends?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
     never                        always 
                   
11. What percentage of your friends are Euro-Americans?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
     %10                                        about             %90  
   or less                                       %50                                      or more 
 
12. How much do you read, listen to, and watch English (in books, in newspapers, in music, 
on TV, on the web, in the movies, etc.)? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all                         very much 
 
13. How often do you write in English? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
not at all                        very much  
 
 
14. How often do you think in English?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
   never                           always 
 
 
15. Please indicate when you came to USA (If you are an international student or a migrant. 
Otherwise write "N/A") _____________ 
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Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (1965) 
Next, you will be presented with several statements concerning your feelings about yourself. 
Please rate each item on how much each statement reflects your feelings on the following 
seven point scale: 
 
1(strongly disagree)  
2(disagree)  
3(somewhat disagree)  
4(neither agree nor disagree) 
5(somewhat agree)  
6(agree)  
7(strongly agree) 
 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times, I think I am no good at all. 
 
 
Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES) 
 
Now, you will be asked to evaluate several statements in terms of how well each represents 
your feelings right now. While evaluating these statements, please consider what is true for 
you at this very moment; NOT what is true for you in general. 
 
1 (not at all) 
2 (a little bit) 
3 (somewhat) 
4 (very much) 
5 (extremely) 
 
1. I feel confident about my abilities.  
2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.  
3. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.  
4. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.  
5. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.  
6. I feel that others respect and admire me.  
7. I am dissatisfied with my weight.  
8. I feel self-conscious.  
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9. I feel as smart as others.  
10. I feel displeased with myself.  
11. I feel good about myself.  
12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.  
13. I am worried about what other people think of me.  
14. I feel confident that I understand things.  
15. I feel inferior to others at this moment.  
16. I feel unattractive.  
17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.  
18. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.  
19. I feel like I’m not doing well. 
20. I am worried about looking foolish.  
 
Three sub-scale of Scott's (1965) Personal Values Scale 
Please evaluate the following statements in terms of how desirable it is for you to have the 
attribute described in each statement. 
1 (not desirable at all) 
2 (undesirable)  
3 (somewhat undesirable) 
4 (neither desirable nor undesirable) 
5 (somewhat desirable)  
6 (desirable) 
7 (extremely desirable) 
 
Intellectualism sub-scale 
1. Having a keen interest in international, national, and local affairs. 
2. Having a strong intellectual curiosity. 
3. Developing an appreciation of the fine arts –music, drama, literature, ballet. 
4. Having an active interest in all things scholarly  
5. Having cultural interests 
6. Striving to gain new knowledge about the world 
7. Enjoying books, music, art, philosophy and sciences 
8. Keeping abreast of current events 
9. Knowing what is good in the world of politics. 
10. Keeping up with world news through regular reading or by watching informative 
programs. 
11. Being an intellectual. 
12. Having restricted and narrow interests. 
13. Having no knowledge of current events. 
14. Being interested only in one's work. 
15. Having no opinions about the world situation.  
16. Knowing only one's specialty. 
17. Having little interest in arts, theater, music, and other cultural activities. 
18. Being uninterested in national and world affairs. 
19. Showing little interest in the final things of life. 
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20. Ignoring what goes on in the world around one. 
21. Reading only things that don't pose any intellectual challenges. 
Physical Development sub-scale 
1. Being graceful and well coordinated in physical movements. 
2. Taking good care of one's physical self, so that one is always healthy. 
3. Being good in some form of sport 
4. Developing physical strength and agility 
5. Developing an attractive body that others will admire 
6. Having a good figure or physique. 
7. Having good muscular coordination. 
8. Being a well-developed, outdoors type who enjoys physical activity. 
9. Keeping a good physical shape 
10. Exercising regularly. 
11. Being physically weak and puny. 
12. Being an indoor type, and avoiding outdoor activities. 
13. Being poorly proportioned physically 
14. Being uninterested in sports 
15. Being listless and uninterested in strenuous activity. 
16. Being awkward in bearing and walk 
17. Being unable to do anything that requires physical effort. 
18. Being unskilled in any form of athletics. 
19. Ignoring one's own physical condition. 
20. Avoiding any form of exercise. 
Creativity sub-scale  
1. Being able to create beautiful and artistic objects. 
2. Developing new and different ways of doing things. 
3. Constantly developing new ways of approaching things. 
4. Inventing gadgets for the fun of it. 
5. Trying out new ideas. 
6. Being original in one's thoughts and ways of looking at things.  
7. Always looking at new roads to travel. 
8. Doing unusual things. 
9. Creating unusual works of art. 
10. Being an innovator. 
11. Creating beautiful things for the enjoyment of other people. 
12. Devoting one's entire energy to the development of new theories. 
13. Doing routine things all the time. 
14. Not having any new ideas. 
15. Always doing things in the same way. 
16. Enjoying a routine patterned life. 
17. Doing things the same way other people do them. 
18. Abiding by traditional ways of doing things. 
19. Repeating the ideas of others, without any innovation. 
20. Working according to a schedule that doesn't vary from day to day.. 
21. Painting or composing or writing in a traditional style 
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22. Keeping one's life from changing very much. 
 
Honor Values Scale (Cross et al., 2010) 
Please indicate the desirability of having the attributes described in each item using the scale 
below 
1 (not desirable at all) 
2 (undesirable) 
3 (somewhat undesirable) 
4 (neither desirable nor undesirable) 
5 (somewhat desirable) 
6 (desirable) 
7 (extremely desirable) 
 
Behavior and character sub-scale  
1. Being just 
2. Not cheating 
3. Not to cheat on people 
4. Keeping promises 
5. Not to steal anything 
6. Honesty 
7. Not to use others for my own benefit 
8. Having a clean life 
9. To have a good moral character 
10. Not telling lies 
11. Not being a hypocrite 
Convictions and pride sub-scale  
1. To have my own principles 
2. To apply my own virtues in life 
3. Having my own attitude towards life 
4. Having my own beliefs 
5. Holding myself with dignity 
6. Having my own virtues 
7. Not to let myself be oppressed by others 
8. To feel proud of myself 
9. Feeling that I am a person with dignity 
10. Being confident 
11. Not compromising my own characteristics 
12. Being determined 
13. The value I give to myself 
Helping others sub-scale  
1. To be helpful to other people 
2. Doing good things for others 
3. Being willing to sacrifice 
4. To be involved in community work 
5. Saving someone 
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6. Doing something for society 
Status and respect sub-scale  
1. My position in the society 
2. To reach a certain status in the society 
3. How much the society values me 
4. To be respectable in the society 
5. Being admirable 
6. Being appreciated 
7. Being respected 
8. Not to have my own truths to contradict with society's truths 
9. To be highly regarded 
10. To fit into customs and traditions 
11. Social esteem 
12. To make others proud 
13. To be respected for what I do 
14. Being successful 
15. Being respected for my achievements 
16. Winning an award 
Dishonor sub-scale  
1. To cheat 
2. Dishonesty 
3. Violate other people's rights 
4. To commit injustice 
5. To stab someone in the back 
6. Treating others poorly 
7. To be untrustworthy 
8. To lie 
9. To trick other people 
10. To slander someone's name 
11. Committing fraud 
12. To steal  
13. To use people 
14. Not keeping promises 
15. Hypocrisy 
16. To be unfair 
17. Thinking only of myself 
18. Being a freeloader 
Filler items  
1. Respecting the nature and environment. 
2. Keeping my books and study materials organized. 
3. Being able to take benefit of new technological developments. 
4. Having enough sleep. 
5. Being efficient in multitasking. 
6. Being able to manage my time effectively. 
7. Not procrastinating. 
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8. Following traffic rules. 
9. Completing tasks fast. 
10. Completing tasks precisely  
 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
 
 The IAT is a computerized reaction time test. First, five words related to the category 
of self, and five words related to the category of other appeared on the computer monitor. 
One of two different keys (A and L) of the keyboard was associated with only one of the 
categories. Participants were asked to press the correct key for each word that randomly 
appears on the monitor. 
 Second, a separate set of five words related to the category of shame, and five words 
related to the category of pride appeared on the computer monitor. Again, one of two 
different keys (A and L) of the keyboard were associated with only one of the categories. 
Participants were asked to press the correct key for each word that randomly appears on the 
monitor. After this, these two tasks were combined in four different versions: 1. Self and 
shame category words associated with the same key. 2. Other and pride category words 
associated with the same key. 3. Self and pride category words associated with the same key 
4. Other and shame category words associated with the same key. 
 
List of words in the “self” category: ME, MINE, WE, OUR, MYSELF 
List of words in the “other” category: OTHERS, THEM, THEIRS, HIS, HE 
List of words in the “shame” category: SHAME, EMBARASSMENT, DISGRACE, 
DISREPUTE, HUMILIATION 
List of words in the “pride” category: PRIDE, DIGNITY, RESPECT, PRAISE, ESTEEM. 
 
Example Screen-Shot of the Computer Monitor (Instructions for Block 6): 
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Facial Emotions Perception Task 
Pictures Used As Stimuli 
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Instructions and Example Item 
Next, you will be presented with several pictures of people. Indicate the extent to which each 
of the following five emotions (anger, shame, pride, anxiety, disgust) are depicted in each 
picture. 
 
 Example 1: 
SHAME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Not at all               Very 
       Strong                                                                                                          Strong 
 
 Example 2: 
ANGER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Not at all               Very 
       Strong                                                                                                          Strong 
113 
 
  
Bogus Information Processing Task 
 
 A set of 20 words appeared on the computer monitor a random 10 of which appeared 
on the right side of monitor, and 10 of which appeared at the left side of the monitor. 
Participants were asked to press a different key for each left and right side words.  
 
The list of stimulus words:   
APPLE, RED, PRECISION, TIME, EFFICIENCY, ORDER, ANGER, SHAME, 
BEAUTIFUL, CALM, EMBARRASSED, SNOOZE, PRIDE, MINUTE, BLUE, FOUR, 
FACE, QUICK, PINK, SPEED.  
 
Example Screen-Shot of the Computer Monitor (Instructions): 
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APPENDIX B: MATERIALS USED IN SESSION 2  
Honor Insult 
 
PCSC-Rev.3 (Personality and Context Specific Social-Cognition Inventory --Edition 3 –
REVISED)  
 
Feedback form for individual participant 
Participant #:  0110 
 
Flags Dimension Aspect Participant 
Raw Score 
Maximum 
Score 
Possible 
Percentile Rank 
(Standing in the 
comparable 
population) 
 Socio-cognitive 
Information 
Processing 
Perception/Cog
nitive Speed 
44 65 56 
! Personality and 
Values 
Insight/Psychol
ogical Control 
12 65 17 
 Personality and 
Values 
Global 
Processing/Unc
ertainty 
Avoidance 
41 65 51 
 
Percentile ranking refers to the percent of people in the initial validation study who scored 
lower than the participant.  
 
For feedback purposes, detailed explanation is provided only for scores below average. 
For statistical data and explanations for all three dimensions, see abridged report version 3.52 
 
Descriptions (only for flagged aspects) 
 
                 Aspect 1: Perception/Cognitive Speed 
NA 
!     Aspect 2: Insight/Psychological Control                     
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 A raw score of 36 is average for this subscale. 
 Young adults scoring above the average (especially at or 
above 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional insight into 
their feelings and emotions. As a result, they are more 
likely to be honest towards themselves and towards other 
people. These positive characteristics are combined with 
self-control and general social adaptiveness.  
 Below average scores: Young adults who score below 25th 
percentile are more likely to reflect low levels of 
psychological control. Low scores point to a tendency to 
engage in socially harmful or dishonest behavior especially 
under stress. These behaviors might vary from cheating, 
abusing other people's resources and even fraud or stealing 
in extreme cases.  
 Scores below the 20th percentile usually points to a lack 
of self-insight, where the individual would be prone to 
engage in defensive mechanisms to rationalize his/her 
behaviors. Low scorers are advised initially to take small 
steps towards improving their behavior (e.g., not to ask 
favors from friends when it would put the friends under 
stress). Gradually try more complex tasks (e.g., not to lie 
in order to hide from responsibilities). 
 
                 Aspect 3: Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance 
NA 
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PCSC-Rev.3 (Personality and Context Specific Social-Cognition Inventory --Edition 3 –
REVISED)  
Abridged Report –3.52 
 
Scale Characteristics 
 
Dimension Aspect Possible Score 
Range 
Mean α Kurtosi
s 
Socio-Cognitive 
Information 
Processing 
Perception/Cognitive 
Speed 
8-65 40 .874 4.379 
Personality and 
Values 
Insight/Psychological 
Control 
8-65 36 .821 4.467 
Personality and 
Values 
Global 
Processing/Uncertaint
y Avoidance 
8-65 38 .896 2.946 
 
 
Aspect 1: Perception/Cognitive Speed 
 
A raw score of 40 is average for this subscale. The distribution is slightly 
skewed towards low scores. Young adults scoring above the average (especially 
at or above the 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional perceptual agility and 
cognitive speed. As a result, they are more likely to be efficient multitaskers. 
This positive characteristic contributes to social abilities such as monitoring 
multiple incoming social stimuli (such as being able to carry out meaningful 
conversations with more than one person simultaneously). Young adults scoring 
below the 25th percentile are more likely to experience difficulties under 
perceptual stress. In other words, information coming from multiple modalities 
(i.e., visual, auditory, tactile) reduces performance for these people.  
Scores below the 10th percentile also point to concentration difficulties 
accompanied by attention deficits. Low scorers are advised to take several steps 
towards improving their cognitive and social performance. In the cognitive 
realm, for instance, they should avoid noise and other unrelated stimuli as much 
as possible while learning new material. Precision in performance should be 
preferred to speed. In the social realm, complex social situations might increase 
the perceptual/social stress, and depressive mood. Structured social interactions 
should be preferred by these individuals. 
 
Aspect 2: Insight/Psychological Control 
 
A raw score of 36 is average for this subscale. Young adults scoring above the 
average (especially at or above 75th percentile) demonstrate exceptional insight 
into their feelings and emotions. As a result, they are more likely to be honest 
towards themselves and towards other people. These positive characteristics are 
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combined with self-control and general social adaptiveness.  
Below average groups: Young adults scoring at the bottom 25 percent are more 
likely to reflect low levels of psychological control. Low scores point to a 
tendency to engage in socially harmful or dishonest behavior especially under 
stress. These behaviors might vary from cheating, abusing other people's 
resources and even fraud or stealing in extreme cases. Scores below the 20th 
percentile usually points to a lack of self-insight, where the individual would be 
prone to engage in defensive mechanisms to rationalize his/her behaviors.  
Low scorers are advised initially to take small steps towards improving their 
behavior (e.g., not to ask favors from friends when it would put the friends 
under stress). Gradually try more complex tasks (e.g., not to lie in order to hide 
from responsibilities). 
 
Aspect 3: Global Processing/Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
A raw score of 38 is average for this subscale. The distribution is normal within 
the population of young adults. Young adults scoring above the average 
demonstrate high levels of uncertainty avoidance. They perform best when the 
social environment is structured. They prefer consistency in the actions of 
themselves and social others. They evaluate most social situations (e.g., 
behavior of others) in a context specific way. Young adults scoring below the 
average demonstrate low levels of uncertainty avoidance. They perform most 
efficiently in unstructured social environments; and they evaluate most social 
situations with global attributions. Adults scoring within one standard deviation 
of the average do not demonstrate any consistent pattern of preference. 
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Honor and Self-Affirmation Manipulations 
Instructions for Honor-Affirmation Task 
 Please think about an incident in which you behaved in an honest, trustworthy, and 
just way even when doing so could hurt you. For example, you didn't deceive a person, 
behave unfairly, violate someone’s trust, or engage in a dishonest act that could benefit you 
greatly, even though the opportunity presented itself with minimal costs, if any. Why and 
how did you choose to do the right thing? What did you gain psychologically? Please write 
down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen. If you never experienced 
such a distinct event, think for a moment about the importance of honesty and trust in your 
life. Try to write down your ideas about the psychological benefits you experienced or hope 
to gain as a result of following these principles. You have approximately 5 minutes to 
complete this writing task. 
Instructions for Self-Affirmation Task 
 Intellectualism. Think for a moment about the importance of intellectual and 
political curiosity in your life, or your cultural interests. Think about the activities you enjoy 
doing, such as reading books, following the news, going to concerts or art festivals. Consider 
the time you spend on doing these activities, and escape the routines of daily life. How much 
time do you spend doing such activities? What do you gain intellectually and 
psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer 
screen, describing the satisfaction you experience as a result of your devotion to your 
intellectual or cultural interests. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing 
task. 
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 Physical Development. Please think for a moment about the importance of physical 
activity and sports in your life. Think about the activities you enjoy doing, such as being part 
of a sports team, doing exercise, or enjoying walks out in the nature. How much time do you 
spend doing such activities? What do you gain physically and psychologically? Please write 
down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer screen, describing the satisfaction 
you experience as a result of your devotion to your physical development. You have 
approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task. 
 Creativity. Think for a moment about the importance of creativity in your life. Think 
about the activities you enjoy doing, such as creating beautiful and artistic objects, writing in 
an original style, integrating new and innovative ideas into your scholarly work, or traveling 
in order to explore different cultures and ways of life. Consider the ways in which these 
activities help you escape the routines of daily life. What do you gain intellectually and 
psychologically? Please write down a paragraph in the space provided on the computer 
screen, describing the satisfaction you experience as a result of your devotion to trying out 
new ideas. You have approximately 5 minutes to complete this writing task. 
 
Final Evaluation Form 
Thanks a lot for participating in this study. The following questions are prepared with the 
intention of collecting feedback from our participants in order to improve future study 
designs. Your feedback is very valuable for us. Please take a minute to complete the 
questionnaire. 
 
1. Have you ever participated in research before?   Yes__________ No__________ 
 
2. How polite/respectful was the experimenter?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremely rude/            Extremely polite/ 
Disrespectful           Respectful 
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3. Were the instructions clear and easy to follow?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Very complicated/         Very clear/ 
Difficult to follow                  Easy to follow 
 
4. a. Please think about the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this 
session. What was the dimension of personality on which you received your highest 
score? _______________________________________________________________.  
 
b. Please report your percentile ranking as accurately as you can remember: _________.  
 
 
5. a. What was the dimension of personality on which you received your lowest score? 
_______________________________________________________________.  
 
b. Please report your percentile ranking as accurately as you can remember: _________.  
 
6. How helpful was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not helpful            Extremely 
at all                  helpful 
 
7. How accurate was the personality feedback you received at the beginning of this session 
in terms of reflecting your characteristics?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not accurate           Extremely 
at all                accurate  
 
8. How much do you agree with the personality feedback you received at the beginning of 
this session?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Completely                    Completely 
disagree                   agree 
 
9. Would you consider taking into account the feedback you received for self-improvement 
purposes?  
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Not at all           Definitely 
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Debriefing Interview Form 
 
Participant # _____             Experimenter ___________ 
 
1. Do you have any questions about this experiment?  
 
 
2. Was the experiment clear in its overall purpose?   
 
 
3. Did all aspects of the procedure make sense?  Was anything odd or confusing?  
 
 
4. Had you heard anything about this study before coming?  
 
 
5. In your own words, what do you think is the purpose of this study?  
 
 
6. What did you think about the feedback (personal scores) you received at the beginning 
of this session?   
 
 
Overall impression of the participant 
 
1 = no suspicion;  
2 = were suspicious, but did not explain why; could not specify 
3 = clearly saw through the cover story and knew the true purpose of the study. 
 
 
 
